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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
Federalism in the United States is an established fact. City 
governments provide goods and services to city residents and county 
governments provide goods and services to city and county residents. 
The same is true for special districts, school districts, states and 
the federal government. Space is divided into a network of governments. 
The federal government operates over the entire country. States sub-
divide the country into 50 parts. Counties subdivide the States. 
Cities exist as separate government areas in. the counties of Oklahoma 
and most other states. Each individual is a resident of several govern-
mental jurisdictions. The problems involved with allocation of goods 
and services in a federal system have been the source of much discussion 
and study. This dissertation is a contribution to the discussion. 
Purpose 
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the causes of 
expenditure changes in the overlay of public sector expenditures. 
' 
Previous efforts have been made by others to determine the efficient 
level of government to provide a particular public service as well as 
the effi~ient degree of federalism. Generally, these studies agree that 
certain goods with certain characteristics should be allocated by certain 
orders of government. Breton develops a utility function where spillover 
1 
2 
benefits are spatially distributed and determines the size and number 
of orders of government. 1 Oates and Tullock consider political and 
decision costs. 2 Tiebout manufactures a Loschian-type hierarchy based 
on two aspects of cost minimizat1on: output and area. 3 Borukhov adds 
population density to Tiebout 1 S analysiso 4 Their theoretical arguments 
imply a public sector overlay, analogous to the Loschian private sector, 
where utility is maximized for the median voter in each government. 
This dissertation first develops a model of utility maximization 
for the median voter in the context of a spatial system of government. 
This model is then integrated with the hierarchial overlay of governments. 
This discussion provides the theoretical basis for the empirical tests 
performed. Then instead of testing empirically for deviations from the 
efficient system of federalism in Oklahoma, this dissertation examines 
the causes of expenditure changes in the public sector for Oklahoma as 
it presently exists. This does not assume any efficiency criteria. 
Individuals in the private sector maximize utility by purchasing a 
certain bundle of goods given relative prices, individual income and 
individual preferences. A change in relative price, for example, causes 
1Albert Breton, 11 A Theory of Government Grants, 11 Canadian Journal 
of Economics and Political Science, XXXI, May 1965, pp. 173-187. 
2Gordon Tullock, 11 Federalism: Problems of Scale, 11 Public Choice, VI 
(Spring 1969), pp. 19-29. Wallace Oates, Fiscal Federalism (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc. 1972), pp. 31-53. 
3charles M. Tiebout, 11 An Economic Theory of Fiscal Decentralization,~~ 
Public Finance: Needs, Sources and Utilization, Ed. National Bureau of 
Economic Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 
pp. 78-96. 
4Eli Borukhov, 11 0ptimal Service Areas for Provision and Finance 
of Local Goods, 11 Public Finance, XXVII (Spring 1972), pp. 267-282. 
3 
an adjustment in quantity demanded so that a new position of maximum 
ut i1 i ty can be reached. Likewise, in the pub 1 i c sector of the economy 
changes in the area over which a good is allocated, or changes in popu-
lation density in a jurisdiction cause the individual to adjust the 
equilibrium quantity of a public good to change so that an individual 
can reach a new position of maximum utility. Thus, by fitting public 
expenditures to various independent variables developed from the theory 
and available data sources, it is possible to examine how these variables 
affect movements in the pattern of expenditure in the Oklahoma hierarchy 
of governments. Most cross sectional studies of state and local finance 
have lumped the state, county and city government expenditure data 
together. By narrowing the scope of the empirical work to the city and 
county governments and by separating city expenditures from county 
expenditures, it becomes possible to examine how independent variables 
affect city expenditures relative to county expenditures, It is stressed 
that this study is intended to show the factors influencing spending 
patterns in the Oklahoma system of governments and that these factors 
are of importance in governmental planning. 
Scope of The Study 
This dissertation has three tasks: (1) a discussion of the 
expenditure pattern that results from a federal system; (2) the develop-
ment of a conceptual model for maximizing utility in the public sector; 
(3) an examination of the causes of expenditure changes in Oklahoma 
using the variables from the model as independent variables in a regres-
sion analysis. 
4 
Chapter II argues that the pattern of government that results from 
a federal system is a hierarchial overlay analogous to a Loschian system. I 
A presentation of the Loschian system is given for the private sector. 
The groundwork is laid for viewing several models of public sector 
hierarchies. 
Chapter III presents a utility maximization model for the median 
voter in separate voting jurisdictions. This model results in a pattern 
of government similar to the public sector hierarchy described in 
Chapter II. 
Chapter IV is the presentation of the empirical work. The indepen-
dent variables in chapter are proxies for the variables in equation 
(9) from Chapter III. The dependent variables are per capita expendi-
tures, dollar expenditures and expenditure ratios. Regression equations 
are estimated to determine the effect of the independent variables on 
expenditures in the hierarchy of government responsibility in Oklahoma. 
Chapter V presents the conclusion and policy implication. 
Findings of the Study 
The following list summarizes the pertinent findings of the 
empirical study. 
(l) Per capita expenditure shows a positive and generally elastic 
response to median family income by county area. Per capita expenditure 
is defined as expenditure in dollars by government unit divided by 
population in the same government unit. Higher elasticities for indivi-
dual city categories indicates that increased median family income would 
result in higher per capita expenditure for city residents relative to 
county residents. This conclusion is for public expenditure only. 
It does not measure the private expenditure response to median family 
income for individuals providing some of their own services. For 
example, a family could provide water and sewerage services for them-
selves. This expenditure is not measured in the equations. 
5 
(2) When urbanization is defined as the percent of population in 
county i that lives in municipal areas, the estimated equations reveal 
several important conclusions about urbanization: A) increased urban-
ization of the population may increase per capita expenditures for both 
city and county residents; B)· per capita· county highway expenditures 
increase with urbanization·indicating that increased urbanization imposes 
costs on nonurban residents; C) city per capita expenditure for sanita-
tion, sewerage, and perhaps for parks and recreation, highways and 
financial administration go up with increased urbanization; and D) 
aggregating data into a total expenditure category can hide these results. 
(3) The area variable is defined as the percent of the total 
county area for county i that is legally contained in municipal areas. 
The results for the area variable with respect to spatial dimension 
suggest the following: A) per capita county expenditures, particularly 
those with a spatial dimension fall with decreased relative urban area; 
B) per capita city expenditure increase for fire protection and public 
buildings with increased relative urban area; C) so~e categories such 
as police protection which would be expected to have a spatial dimension 
apparently do not. 
(4) The number of elected officials in county i, elected fork city 
and county governments reduces tota 1 per capita expenditures at the 
county level. The coefficients do have the expected positive sign for 
city per capita expenditures with significantly high F-values. The 
number of elected officials is used as a proxy for the administrative 
costs of additional governments. 
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(5) A variable was constructed showing the sum of incorporated city 
distance for city j from the nearest city at least twice as large or at 
least 2,500 population for each town in county i divided by the number 
of cities, n, in county i. Selected county expenditure categories like 
highways and financial- administration showed higher per capita expendi-
ture as this distance variable for cities increases. 
(6) A one percent increase in urbanization results in a greater 
than one percent increase in urban dollar expenditures for all major 
categories. The percentage increase is relatively lower for those 
categories of expenditure that are shared with the county. Thus, county 
expenditures are substituted for city expenditure to a small degree. 
(7) Dollar expenditure shows a highly elastic response to median 
family income for both city and county governments. Furthermore, the 
elasticities are higher for luxury services like parks, recreation and 
libraries. 
(8) As the distance between cities increases, county expenditures 
increase, but city do 11 a r expenditures do not. 
(9) The coefficients for the number of elected officials is 
positive for both city and county governments. The elasticities are 
generally higher for city than for county governments showing a relative 
shift to city government. This result is stronger when per capita 
expenditures are used. 
(10) An increase in the percent of the county area urbanized implies 
an increase in dollar expenditures for both city and county governments. 
Elasticities-are higher for city than county expenditure categories. 
7 
Urbanized areas are likely to have a fringe of nonurbanized population 
which requires the county to increase its allocation of services, 
People surrounding a city require more services from the county govern-
ment than their more rural counterparts. This result does not show up 
when per capita expenditure data are used. 
CHAPTER II 
LOSCH AND THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to show that economic efficiency 
criteria are best met in a federal system and that this system•s division 
of functions between levels of government results in a Loschian hierarchy 
analogous to the one existing in the private sector. The central problem 
discussed here is the allocation of goods and services between central 
and sub-central governments. The first two sections of this chapter 
develop the Loschian system and several research methods on central place 
hierarchies are sampled. The final section discusses public hierarchies. 
Several studies on public hierarchies are reviewed and it is shown that 
a federal system develops along lines similar to those of a Loschian 
hierarchy. 
The Loschian Theory 
Introduction 
Since it will be shown that the public sector develops along the 
same spatial hierarchy as a Loschian hierarchy in the private sector, it 
is necessary to review the Loschian hierarchy for the private sector. 
8 
9 
Nourse 1 S Presentation of Losch 
The Loschian system begins with the assumption of a homogeneous 
plain with a uniform distribution of population, resources and income 
and with transportation costs equal in every direction. 1 Each commodity 
has a uniform network of markets or trading areas. Furthermore, each 
commodity or service with the same threshold size will locate in the 
centers of the same market area. It is assumed that only networks are 
possible and that they fit together so that each market area includes s 
areas of the next smaller size. If~ equals three, three of the smallest 
trading areas will fit into the next largest market. Each central place 
with the same number of market centers will have the same commodities 
and services, Although population has been assumed to be equally distri-
buted, there are central places of different importance generated on the 
plain, The smallest central places will provide services to the same 
number of rural people~' and will have the same population. The popula-
tion of each of these smallest places will be some proportion, t, of the 
rural and central place population served, The next larger place will 
include s number of the smallest places and its population will be the 
same proportion t of the population served. The population served 
includes the~ smaller central places and the~ rural populations served 
by each plus the population of this higher central place. The smallest 
are first-order places, The next largest will be second-order places 
and so on. 
1Hugh 0. Nourse, Regional Economics- (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 
1968), pp. 32-62. 
Beckmann 
The relationship between trading areas and systems of cities has 
been formalized by Beckmann. 2 If 
m = order of a place 
P = population served by a place of the mth order 
m 
em: population of places of the mth order 
k = proportion of population served located in central place 
s =number of places in the m-1 order served qy places in the 
mth order 
r = rural population served by 1st order place 
then (1) Cm = kPm 
(2) P = C + sPm 1 m m -
therefore 
(3) Pm = kPm + sPm-l 
and solving for Pm so Pm- kPm = sPm-l, then 
(4) Pm = (s/l-k)Pm_1 and solved 
Also 
(5) Pm = P1(s/l-k). 
(6) P ~ rsm-l/(1-k)m because we know 
m 
(7) P1 = r + c1 and 
(8) c, = k(P1) = k(r + c1) = kr/1-k and 
10 
(9) pl = r + kr/1-k = r/1-k, which can be substituted into (5) to 
get (6). Further substitution of (6) into (1) gives 
( 1 0) em= ksm-lr/(1-k)m. 
2M. J. Beckmann, 11 City Hierarchies and the Distribution of City 
Size, 11 Economic Development and Cultural Change, VI (April, 1958), 
pp. 243-248. 
11 
There are six factors governing the proportions in the hierarchy. They 
· are; ~' ~' ~' f~ !~ and I~ The first three factors are as noted above. 
The fourth~ total population (P), is derived when m reaches its largest 
value, which is the fifth factor, N. Therefore (6) becomes 
( 11) 
This can be rearranged by dividing _out to get 
(12) r = (1-k)NP/sN-1 and 
(13) N = log{Ps/r)/log(s/1-k), 
The sixth factor is the total number of cities (T). It is derieved by 
forming a series from s and N: 
( 14) T = 1 + s + s2 + . . .. + SN = SN+ l - 1/s-1 . 
Thus, a general system-with six variables results. If four are known or 
given the other two can be calculated. Suppose k = l/2, s = 3, r = 1,000, 
and N = 6 are know:n, then T and P can be found~ It can be shown that 
the system in Table I is determined. 
TABLE I 
A LOSCHIAN SYSTEM 
Order Population Population served Rank of Centers by each Center 
1 1,000 2,000 243 
2 6,000 12,000 81 
3 36,000 72,000 27 
4 216,000 432,000 9 
5 1,296,000 2,592,000 3 
6 7 '776 ,000 15,552,000 1 
Source: H. 0. Nourse, Regional Economics (New York: McGraw Hill Book 
Co., 1971), p. 41. 
12 
This system can explain location, geographic size and the spacing of 
economic activity. It also can explain the range of goods and services 
offered to consumers in towns of different size. Lower-order cities 
supply a smaller range of goods and services to a smaller area. Higher-
order centers are more complex~ offering a greater ~ange of goods, 
services and retail activities. 
Emperical Studies of Loschian Systems 
Introduction 
Several methods used in empirical research on central place hier-
archies will be surveyed in this section. No attempt is made to cover 
the entire literature on the subject, since a complete listing is avail-
able in a periodically updated bibliography of central place studies. 3 
The purpose here is to present a few studies using different empirical 
methods which provide an appreciation of the Loschian hierarchy essen-
tial in understanding the public hierarchy to be developed later in 
this chapter and Chapter III. 
Rank-size Rule 
According to the Beckmann formulation presented above, the rank of 
a city increases by multiples of~ as city size increases by multiples 
of s/1-k. Thus, if k is close 'to zero the rank multiplied by the city 
size approaches a constant. More formally, Beckman~ shows that the city 
3Brian J. L. Berry and Allen Pred, Central Place Studies, A 
Biblio ra h of Theor and A lications, Bibliography Series No. 1 with 
supplement Philadelphia: Regional Science Research Institute, 1965), 
pp. l-68, 
13 
halfway in the nth size class is 1 + s + ... + sn-l =sn-1/s-1 + n212 
which is approximately given as sn(l/2 + l/s-1). Therefore size is; 
(15) PN-n ~ kr/s/(1-k)N-n. 
The product of rank and size is; 
(16) kr/s(l/2 + 1/s-l)(s/l-k)N(l-k)n = C(l-k)n. 
Thus C depends on k, r, s, and N. As k approaches zero, then (1-k)n 
approximates the product of the rank and size. 
Now the general equation for the rank size rule is: 
(17) rsa = C 
where 
r = city rank 
s = population of city 
a = a constant 
C = a constant approximately equal to the population 
of the largest place.4 
Logarithms of both sides of the equation can be taken, allowing estima-
tion by ordinary least-squares procedures, If the rank size rule holds, 
~should be approximately equal to one. A value of~ that is approxi-
mately equal to one would indicate a hierarchial system of cities, 
assuming no statistical problems. However, a value that deviates from 
one is not sufficient evidence to conclude against the validity of the 
hierarchy since the rule is contingent on t being close to zero. It is 
quite possible to have~ equal to l/2 and still have a perfect system of 
central places. Indeed, the earlier example of Nourse is such a case. 
Thus, the rank-size method of verification of the hierarchy is limited. 
4M, J. Beckmann, 11 City Hierarchies and the Distribution of City 
Size, 11 Economic Development and, Cultural Change, VI (April, 1958), 
pp. 243-248. 
14 
Distance Measurement Studies 
Losch focused his empirical efforts on Iowa. 5 He concluded that 
central places did in fact correspond to a case of the general framework. 
Losch set s = 4 by grouping equal sized cities into classes, His theo-
retical distribution of cities was based on actual distanees between 
settlements in the lowest size class. Trading places the same distance 
apart would have the same number and type of trading activities. The 
distance apart is based on the formula: 
I (17) b=a(n) 2 
where, 
b = distance between central places of the same size 
a = distance between smallest settlements 
n = number of smallest settlements served by the 
central place. 
With the exception that no sixth order or first ranking city exists, 
prediction and reality were close for distance, population and numbers 
of cities in Iowa. 
A recent attempt has been made by Flood and Schreiner to apply a 
similar method to Oklahoma to determine if a clear differentiation of 
towns based upon the range of goods and services provided existed and, 
if the differentiation existed, the effect of distance from larger towns 
in the region on the differentiation. 6 A multi-county planning region 
was selected for study. A table was constructed where towns less than 
5August Losch, The Economics of Location, (New Haven, Conn.: Yale 
Univ. Press, 1954), pp. 105-120. 
6J. Flood and Dean Schreiner, 11 Availability of Retail and Business 
Services to Rural Populations: Application to South Central Oklahoma, 11 
Research A lication in Economic Develo ment and Plannin , Research 
Report P-665 July, 1972 , pp. 164-176. 
15 
5,000 population were ranked by ryumber of establishments from highest to 
lowest in a horizontal direction. In a vertical direction the 35 types 
of establishments were ranked from the lowest to the highest threshold 
leve1. 7 The hierarchial system depicted in Table II resulted, where an 
X means that such service exists and A has more services than B and B 
more than C. Thus the smallest centers supplied only limited types of 
goods while larger centers supply a wider variety of services. For 
example, gas stations begin to appear in towns of very low population, 
while jewelry stores do not appear until the towns are much larger. 
TABLE II 
RANGE OF GOODS AND SERVICES 
Towns Al A2 Bl B2 c, c2 
Estab. 
Gas X X X X X X Station 
Grocery X X X X X X 
Drug X X X Store 
Farm X X X Equip. 
Household X Appliances 
Jewelry X 
Source: K. Flood and Dean Schreiner, 11 Availability of Retail and 
Business Services to Rural Populations: Application to South 
Central Oklahoma, 11 Research A lication in Economic Develo ment 
and Planning, Research Report P-665 July 1972 ; p. 169. 
7Ibid., p. 169, 
16 
This analysis was applied to 47 centers classified as before. 
Generally, they found three classes of activities. Class one activities 
were found in all sizes of centers and included, gas statiens, grocery 
stores, beauty salons and churches. Class two activities·were found in 
A and B centers and included, drug stores, auto repair shops, laundro-
mats, farm equipment, auto parts, auto dealers and physicians. Class 
three activities were found only in the largest centers and included 
nursing homes, clothing stores, legal services, novelty stores and 
jewelry stores. They chose as the threshold level of an activity the 
1 owest population after the first appearance of the activity such that 
in any sequence of four towns at least two establishments were found. 
The results, summarized in Table III, indicate a Loschian relationship, 
although there are several exceptions. For example, if there is a class 
B town located on a major highway or a major recreation spot~ hotels 
1 
I 
and motels may appear. Also, there may be some overlapping of popula-
tion ranges by classes of town. The authors note this may be due to an 
uneven distribution of resources. Centers in sparsely populated areas 
may offer a greater array of services for a given population base than 
do centers in more densely populated regions. In general, however, a 
Loschian hierarchy seemed to exist in southern Oklahoma. 
Studi~s Using Time and Population 
A further hypothesis of Flood and Schreiner relates population and 
distance factors, Generally the larger cities were expected to be 
farther from urban centers relative to the smaller Band C order centers. 
B centers might be located somewhat nearer the urban centers. C centers 
may be grouped around A centers or B centers that are around A centers 
TABLE II I 
CLASSIFICATION OF ACTIVITIES BY THRESHOLD 
POPULATION AND TOWN CLASS 
Threshold 
Acti viti es Population 
Class l Activities: 
Class C Towns 
Gas Service Station 121 
Grocery Stores 123 
Churches 129 
Agric. Services 
& Supplies 129 
Beauty Salons 165 
Eating Places 165 
Class 2 Activities: 
Class B Towns 
Bottled Gas 228 
Drug Stores 228 
Auto Repair 424 
Lumber Yard 434 
Insurance Agency 439 
Repair Services 439 
Laundry & Laundromats 492 
Drinking Places 587 
Package Liquor 611 
Variety, Dept., 
Ben. Merch. 611 
Florists 611 
Hardware & Paint 611 
Farm Equipment 618 
Furniture & 
Appliances 636 
Auto Parts 706 
Auto & Boat Dealers 706 
Physician's Office 706 
Hotels & Motels 722 
Class 3 Activities: 
Class A Towns 
Nursing Homes 840 
Real Estate Agency 840 
Clothing Stores 950 
Sporting Goods l ,271 
Specialty Retail l ,354 
Legal Services 1 ,524 
Dentist Office 1,524 
Specialized Health l ,640 
Gift & Novelty 1,640 
Jewelry Store 1,862 
Accounting 
Services 2,611 
Range of 
Number of Establish-
ments by Town Class 
l-24 
30-73 
80-113 
Range of 
Population 
by 
Town Class 
121-l '271 
611-l ,640 
1,723-3,995 
Number 
of 
Centers 
23 
19 
5 
Source: J. Flood and Dean Schreiner, "Availability of Retail and Business Services to Rural 
Populations: Application to South Central Oklahoma," Research Application in Economic 
Development and Planning, Research Report P-665 (July 1972), pp. 164-176. 
17 
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and so on. To test such a hypothesis the average distanees-between 
centers was computed. It was determined class A towns averaged 19 miles 
from the nearest urban center. Class B towns grouped around urban 
centers averaged 19 miles from the larger center, whereas those grouped 
around class A towns averaged 26 miles from the center. G centers 
grouped around urban centers averaged 12 miles from the larger center 
versus 36 miles for those class C towns grouped around a. B center which 
were grouped a~ound an A center. Class C towns grouped around class B 
and class A towns which were directly grouped around the urban cen1ter 
averaged 19 and 26 miles respectively and had the expected relative 
proportions. Thus, the general conclusion is that proxi·mity to larger 
urban centers imposes constraints on the·potential service functions 
of a small trade center. This influence existed for almost 20 miles. 
Further, it was determined that class C centers are of two types. First, 
population in class C centers around metropolitan areas may-increase 
rapidly with little or no effect on the number of services provided. 
Second, class C centers farther from metropolitan areas may lose popula-
tion without losing their functions. 
A basic problem with all of the empirical efforts presented so far 
is that none are addressed to the changes that occur over time. Hodge 
studied the spatial changes in the great plains over a twenty year 
period and found dramatic changes. 8 Hodge•s analysis is divided into 
two sections, One is deductive the other is inductive.· The--ded-uctive 
analysis concerns the validity of a number of hypothesis on trade center 
8G. Hodge, 11 The Prediction of Trade Center Viability in the Great 
Plains, .. Regional Science Association Papers, XV (1965),, pp. 87-115. 
19 
change. For example, he suggested that trade centers ranking low in the l 
retail service hierarchy at the beginning would lose rank more rapjijly 
than higher ranking centers. His general empirical method is to 
classify centers into a system of seven types of trade centers. Then 
the number of each type of center is matched with the median population, 
average number of establishments and an index of sales volume. Next, he 
examined changes in the system at intervals over th~ period 1941-6.1. 
His findings indicate that low-ranking ~enters lost rank more rapidly 
! 
than higher ranking centers. Also, smaller trade centers were farther 
apart in 1961 than 1941. The opposite was true for larger centers. The 
empirical method was simply to measure distance apart for the seven 
classes of centers. Finally, the adjacent center may compete enough to 
result in the decline of one or both. Of the 190 pairs of similar trade 
centers spaced less than the mean apart for their class, 79 percent 
experienced relative decline. 9 
The problem with this method is that it cannot predict which centers 
will grow and which will not. Nor is it able to predict which traits, 
except size and location, are more conducive to the growth or decline of 
centers. Hodge utilized principal-axis factor analysis of 35 community 
environment variables for 473 trade centers in Saskatchewan to provide 
anapproach to answer such questions. 10 The community environment 
variables include such things as: population, measures of density and 
age stratifications, local manufacturing, services and education. Using 
the technique of principal axis factor analysis, the 35 community 
9Ibid.' p. 100. 
10Ibid., p. 103. 
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environment factors were condensed mathematically into three faeters. 
The first he denoted as urban size. This is due to high positive load-
ings on population and investment in utilities, retail serviees and 
manufacturing employment. The factor loading is a measure of-the-degree 
of closeness between the variables and the factor. Each faetel" is made 
up of a linear combination of all variables in which the factor loadings 
are analogous to regression coefficients in a multiple regression equa-
tion. The second and third variables he named were farm size-and urban 
density, respectively. Each of the three factors was regressecl-against 
an index of change in number of retail and service establishments in the 
center from 1941-61. Using least-squares, only the urban density scale 
was significant. This scale was dominated by gross populatien density 
at the-center and assessed valuation of private physical investment per 
acre~ In addition to population size and location~ therefore, urban 
density was conducive to changes in the hierarchy. 
Thus, two methods have been applied to better understand the causes 
of trade center change, Such changes in the private sector may result 
in readjustment in the public sphere to be discussed in the next section, 
Summary 
This section and the preceding section have reviewed the-content of 
the Loschian hierarchy and sampled some of the more widely used empirical 
techniques for testing it. The Loschian system was defined in differ-
ence equation form, An example, where k = l/2, s = 3, r = 100 and N = 6, 
was taken from Nourse. Three empirical methods were presented: the rank-
size rule, distance measurement and time and population studies. 
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In general, a central place hierarchy is evident in the private 
secte-r'ef a· market economy. The neatness of the· hypothetical framework 
proposed by Losch and others is obscured by the failure ef the strict 
assumptions of geographical uniformity to be realized in any country. 
For· the purposes of this study four observations are pertinent. First, 
the existence of a hierarchy· in the private. sector, howev.er obscured, 
indicates that an efficient organization of public output might result 
in a similar hierarchy because public output is likely to be needed where 
private activity is greatest. Second, in addition to the geographical 
irregularities, political considerations will result in additional 
irregularities in the public hierarchy. Consequently, a test fer devia-
tions from a perfect hierarchy in the public sector is unnecessary. 
Third, the strong indications of a private hierarchy in the midwestern 
United States, for instance, Iowa and Oklahoma, suggest that a midwestern 
state-such as Oklahoma would be a good state in which to conduct a case 
study efapublic hierarchy. Fourth, and finally, the most useful 
studies of the private hierarchy examine its determinants over-time and 
space. Thus, the empirical study of the public hierarchy conducted in 
Chapter IV takes a similar approach. 
Federalism and Efficiency 
Introduction 
This-section reviews and critically discusses previous work on 
publi~ hierarchies. The purpose is to develop the argument that the 
allocation of the functions among governments· in a federal system forms 1 
a-public hierarchy. Furthermore, this section develops 'the cost variables 
used in Chapter III to analyze the behavior of the median voter. 
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Allocation is the only question discussed. Stabilization and distribu-
tion are assumed to be functions of the central government. Full 
employment, stable prices and a proper distribution of income are also 
assumed. 
Breton 
Breton•s analysis assumes a static order of public goods that can 
be ranked from large to small on the basis of space. 11 This means there 
would be clusters of national goods, regional goods, provincial goods 
and so on. Further he assumes that government functions are economic 
in nature, that only allocation takes place and that prefer~nces are 
revealed. Each individual has a utility function with positive marginal 
utilities for each good. In addition a transformation function exists 
that defines the real resource cost of producing one type of good 
expressed in terms of the amount foregone of the other goods. Maximiz-
ing this function subject to the constraint yields a set of equilibrium 
conditions giving the amount produced and consumed and its costs in terms 
of a numeraire. From this operation Breton analyzes two possible out-
comes: a perfect mapping and an imperfect mapping. 12 The perfect mapping 
is defined as one in which all the benefits of local goods are exhausted 
within the boundaries of the local jurisdiction; benefits of th~ provin-
cial goods within the provincial goods jurisdiction and so on. If these 
' 
goods are paid for by benefit taxes and if· the prices of private goods 
are set by a mechanism which correctly reflects the preferences of 
11 Albert Breton, .. A Theory of Government Grants, .. Canadian Journal 
of Economics and Political Science, XXXI (May 1965), pp. 173-187. 
1. 2Ibid., p. 180. 
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members of society, then a constitution which has as many governments as 
it has different public goods gives an allocation of resources that is 
Pareto optimalo 
Although Breton makes the point later in his discussion, it should 
be noted that benefits-received taxation does not bring about Pareto 
optimality unless it is assumed there are equal preference functions, a 
unanimity voting rule or compensation payments. Assuming any or all of 
these, Pareto optimality results from his analysis. 
An imperfect mapping results when benefits cannot be clearly defined 
and spillovers exist. Breton shows, however, that with an imperfect 
mapping efficiency can be achieved by using conditional grants. 
Breton•s analysis results in a hierarchial system of government. 
In the perfect mapping he describes, first-order governments of the 
Loschian hierarchy would produce a subset of all public expenditures 
defined as local goods. Second-order governments will not only be 
responsible for first-order functions but also contain a second-order 
government responsible for second-order functions. If first-order 
governments were cities and second-order governments were counties, then 
second-order cities would be county seats responsible for administration 
of its own county expenditure and a city government responsible for its 
city public expenditure. Analogously, third-order cities would be state 
capitals which were also county seats as well as cities, These third-
order cities would contain the administrative apparatus for public 
expenditures in three governments, city, county and state, with each 
government extending over a wider area. Given the assumption of a 
homogeneous plain with equal population distribution, income and demand, 
each citizen would be a member of the nth or highest order government 
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and a member of one of each of the 1 ower_ order governments. All space 
would be filled by each order if all the lower order governments are 
counted. Thus, within this framework of the federal system cities exist 
in a hierarchy of responsibility. Higher-order cities contain higher-
order governmrnts which extend over a subset of lower-order governments. 
The highest-otrder city is the federal government which extends over the 
entire countriy. 
Breton's hierarchy does not consider the administrative cost of 
adding more governments. The next three analyses attempt to include 
some of the a~ditional costs of adding more governments. 
Tullock 
Tullock begins by indicating two factors traditionally considered 
in discussions on the size of governmental units. 13 ~he first is 
externality and the second is the optimal scale of production. Figure 1 
shows these two relationships. Absolute geographic or physical size is 
placed on the horizontal axis and cost of chasing a governmental unit is 
on the vertical axis. Costs are total dollar costs for a given level 
of serviceo Size means the physical area of the governmental unit. 
Externalities (E) decrease asymptotically while operating costs (C) are 
U-shaped. Only two things vary: costs for a given level of service and 
physical size. Vertical summation yields TC, with OS indicating the 
optimal-size government unit for a particular public good. Tullock then 
shows that economies of scale are relevant only if the government unit 
must produce the service. If it is able to purchase it from a specialized 
13Gordon Tullock, 11 Federalism: Problems of Scale, 11 Public Choice, 
VI (Spring 1969}, pp. 19-29. 
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Figure 1. Cost in Relation to Size 
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producer, then economies of scale are not a relevant variable in 
determining the sile of the government unit. Only externalities are 
left for consideration. Here, he argues that all externalities cannot 
be entirely internalized because total internalization would normally 
require boundaries which run along some very impressive natural barrier. 
Such a minor matter as street cleaning might require a national govern-
menta 1 unit to totally i nterna 1 i ~e its effects. 14 Therefore, he chooses 
90 percent, an arbitrary number, as the amount of internalization which. 
would determine the optimal size government. 
At this point, Tullock introduces three political costs into the 
analysis. The first is the cost of activities to an individual of which 
he disapproves. These costs increase as the size of the group increases. 
As the voting populatiim is broken into smaller uni;ts, the average level 
of adjustment of government to the preferences of its citizens increases. 
The second is the cost o·f satisfaction lost as the unit of choice is 
raised. The unit of choice is the number and size of the goods and 
services offered. Using Tullock•s example, suppose all restaurants pre-
sent menus in an a-la-carte fashion so individual choice is allowed. 15 
Then, suppose that only fixed meals are presented. If all possible 
combinations of the previous a-la-carte menu were presented, a book 
instead of a page or two would be required for the fixed meal menu. 
Therefore, only a dozen or so fixed menus are presented. Freedom of 
choice exists, but the choice is restricted. Obviously, it is harder to 
pro vi de as wide a range of choice if the unit of choi.ce is 1 arge. 
14Ibid., p. 19. 
15 Ibid., p. 23. 
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The third cost is due to increased bureaucracy. The smaller the 
size of governmental units, the more governments there are and therefore 
the higher the costs of increased bureaucracy. Figure 2 combines all 
costs into one graph to determine the optimal size government. Cost for 
a given service level is measured on the vertical axis. The horizontal 
axis measures the degree of dispersion of government activities. Move-
ment to the right means the government is halved and then halved again 
and so on. S represents the first of the costs presented above, i.e. the 
loss of satisfaction to those voters who did not win. T represents both 
the second and third costs mentioned above. Costs fall as combinations 
are increased and then rise as costs of bureaucracy take over. S + T is 
the vertical summation. The minimum point is the optimum degree of 
differentiation for governments. Tullock states: 
~ 
~ We have now what appears to be a theoretical structure for 
deciding the degree to which the government should be federal-
ized. A society actually applying our solution would require 
a good deal of empirical research which has not yet been done. 
lf I may be permitted to offer a guess, I would imagine that 
it would end up with each individual being a member of some-
where between five and eight separate governmental units.l6 
Tullock has created a federal hierarchy. Movement to the right 
on Figure 2 increases the degree of federalism. Suppose the minimum 
point on S + T in Figure 2 is 1/8. Then, the four levels of the 
hierarchy are: one federal government, two state governments, four 
county governments and eight city governments. These governments 
provide public output in a hierarchy of jurisdictions. In a private 
good hierarchy a minimum threshold consumption level is necessary for 
demand to call forth local production. As demand increases, the central 
16 Ibid., p. 28. 
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Figure 2. Cost Related to the Degree of Dispersion 
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places in the hierarchy are ranked according to their relative importance 
within the region. The lower-order centers supply only those goods which 
require freque~t purchase. Higher-order centers are more complex and 
offer a greater range of goods over a larger area than lower order cities. 
An efficient system of public allocation might result in a public hier-
archy through the same type of process. A federal government operates 
over the entire country. States subdivide the country into 50 parts. 
Counties subdivide the states and cities subdivide the counties. In 
the private sector, the hierarchy changes with changes in demand and 
changes in technology that alter cost factors. In the public sector, 
institutional factors prevent change in the size of the orders of 
government in the hierarchy. However, they do not prevent adjustments 
in expenditure patterns within this institutionally constant-sized 
hierarchy. These adjustments are analyzed in Chapter IV. 
Oates 
Oates reviews the Breton analysis and concludes; 
In particular, if we no longer have a pure public good 
whose consumption is rigidly defined over precise geo-
graphical subsets of the population, the selection of 
the proper level of government to provide the good 
involves weighing the potential welfare gains from a 
greater decentralization of decision making against 
the possible gains from· increased centralization.l7 
He goes on to determine the optimal-sized jurisdiction by fixing popula-
tion and reducing decision costs to zero. He uses an impure public 
good whose consumption is not confined to any precise subset of geograph-
ical units. Figure 3 is from Oates and shows the.dost in dollars.on 
17wallace Oates, Fiscal Federalism, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc. 1972), p. 108; · 
$ 
0 n size of 
Source: Wallace Oates, fiscal Federalism, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 
Jovanovich, Inc. 1972), p. 39. 
Figure 3. Optimum Group Size 
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the vertical axis and size of group on the horizontal axis. 18 OC is the 
aggregate cost savings from increasing the number of persons consuming 
the good jointly. It increases at a decreasing rate because more people 
are sharing the same cost for the output as the group gets larger. The 
cost of this joint consumption is OL. It is a loss in consumer surplus 
to each individual consumer due to consuming a fixed level of a public 
good. This loss can be shown very easily using the Edgworth box in 
Figure 4. 19 A and~ are persons while~ and~ are private and public 
goods respectively. If~ is constrained to be equal for both, then 
consumption must take place on ll·· OAOB is the contract curve for 
unrestrained consumption. Fix Bon indifference curve s1, then A would 
go to A2 and tangency is at D. However~ is a public good soy is con-
sumed jointly. Now, if B is constrained to s1, A will be on A1 which is 
below indifference curve A2. Thus, the welfare loss to consuming in 
large groups is the difference between A being on indifference curves 
A1 and A2. Under plausible assumptions as the group gets larger the 
loss gets larger as shown by OL in Figure 3. Subtracting OL from OC 
in Figure 3 gives OW. The maximum point on OW is n* which gives the 
optimal group size .. 
Spillovers can be added to the analysis by showing the gain from 
internalizing spillovers by enlarging group size. Adding this to OC 
enlarges the optimal group size and internalizes spillovers. 
Decision costs are taken into account by a curve measuring loss and 
subtracting it from OC. This results in a smaller optimal group size. 
18 Ibid., p. 108. 
19 Ibid., p. 54. 
Source: Wallace Oates, Fiscal Federalism, (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 
1972), p. 57. 
Figure 4. Edgeworth Box in a Public EconomY 
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Oates• analysis is very similar to Tullock•s. He cites Tullock 
frequently and generally considers the same political and governmental 
costs when determining the optimal group size. The difference is that 
Tullock uses a group of public goods and determines the optimal degree 
of federalism all at once, while Oates considers only one good at a time 
when developing the case for impure public goods. Both develop a hier-
archy of government responsibility. One type of public output is assigned 
to one level of government, another type of public output is produced and 
allocated more efficiently over a different government jurisdiction. In 
both analyses each citizen is a member of each order of government in 
the same way that each consumer in the private hierarchy is a member of 
each order in the system of central places. 
T1ebout 
Tiebout provides a more comprehensive economic model of cost-
mini~ization where economies of scale are more carefully considered. 20 
He does not discuss political costs. However, he does introduce distance 
from the point of allocation of public output. 
He assumes a 100 square mile city where population, and demand for 
police protection are uniform. Police protection is a pure public good 
within the precinct patrolled. In this way total output is X = x = p 1 
x2 = . ·. xn' where n is the number of consumers. A unit of protection 
is an index number indicating some relative amount of protection like 
the number of times a police car passes each house. 
20charles M. Tiebout, 11 An Economic Theory of Fiscal Decentraliza-
tion, .. Public Finances: Needs, Sources and Utilization, Ed. National 
Bureau of Economic Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 
pp. 78-96. 
Given these assumptions the problem is to divide space into the 
optimum number of districts. The optimum will be the one where costs 
are minimum. Total costs are assumed to increase for two reasons; 
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(1) given spatial size, total costs will rise with the level of protec-
tion and (2) total cost increases, given the 1evel of output, as spatial • 
size increases. Figure 5 shows the variables which affect cost per 
resident. Cost per resident is on the Z axis, output per resident on 
they axis and miles or population on the x axis. The x axis is 
interpreted to mean that population increases in some proportion k as 
distance increases. Since police protection is assumed to be a pure 
public good, benefits are independent of population size. Area, of 
course, increases as distance increases. As output increases, given 
miles and population, cost per resident increases along CLD. Holding 
output per resident constant and increasing distance means cost per 
resident decreases and then increases along ALB. Changing the x axis 
to unit costs per resident results in a solution analogous to that 
presented in Figure 6. Since demand is the same, economies of scale 
determine the radius of the circle which is to be the size of each indi-
vidual precinct and the level of output necessary for cost-minimization. 
The analysis is altered slightly if the benefits of a service such 
as fire protection, air raid sirens or hospitals diminish as a function 
of distance from the site of production. Assume that fire protection is 
a pure public good whose benefits diminish as distance increases. No 
additional costs are incurred by including additional area. The only 
difference is that benefits fall for those living farther away from fire 
protection. Thus, benefit taxation requires a tax in proportion to the 
share of total benefits. These taxes are allocated in two possible ways~ 
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which result in individual taxes which are unequal. The first makes the 
individual 1 S tax payment proportional to his utility. The second makes 
each individual 1 S utility equal. Each person 1 s taxlis his total 
benefits minus the average utility. 
As Tiebout himself suggests, this analysis results in a hierarchy 
like that of the Loschian hierarchy in the private sector. With tech-
nology given and uniform demand, each public good will establish as 
many branch agencies as economies of scale indicate. Assuming uniform 
demand allows Tiebout to concentrate on determining the optimal sized 
jurisdiction by finding the minimum point on a cost surface where area 
and population are variable as well as quantity. Later in Chapter IV 
it will be argued that demand does not change in any systematic way from 
one jurisdictional configuration to another and that empirical efforts 
shoul~ concentrate on factors affecting cost. 
Borukhov 
This last review seeks to define an optimal service area with 
variable factor substitution and density" 21 Efficiency for a mobile 
population requires that density should be increased until the disutil-
ity from increased density equals the savings in costs" Borukhov assumes 
that cities are agglomerations of people around one public good provided 
by the city. The good is produced at constant cost. Benefits of the 
good decline with distance and therefore individuals prefer to live 
closer to the center up to the point where congestio~ costs become as 
21 Eli Borukhov, 11 0ptimal Service Areas for Provision and Finance 
of Local Public Goods, 11 Public Finance, XXVII (Spring 1972), pp. 267-282" 
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large as benefits from nearby consumption. The problem is to find the 
intensity of land use. Then, it becomes possible to find the city 
population size N that maximizes the per capita surplus of benefits over 
costs. 
Assume a Cobb-Douglas production function: 
( 1 ) H = AL"' K S a:+ S :: 1 
where: H = the quantity of housing produced 
L ~ the quantity of land 
K = the aggregate quantity of other factors 
of production. 
Benefits fall linearly as: 
(2) B = a - bu, where u is distance from the,center. 
Equilibrium requires marginal costs to equal marginal benefits so 
that: 
(3) P1 (u) '"'-b. 
Then: 
(4) H "" H(u) 
is the number of households at every ring of distance from the center. 
Total people in the city is: 
u (5) N = J H(u) du. 
0 
Total value of the benefits is: 
u (6) B* = 6 H(u)(a - bu) du. 
The surplus of benefits over costs is B* minus constant costs (C) 
and the costs of capital used in constructing houses. If the price of 
capital is constant and equal to w and the marginal product of capital 
is K 1 (u) then tota 1 cost wi 11 be: 
u 
(7) wK* = 6 wK 1 (u) du, where k* is total product of capital 
so that 
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(8) S = B* - wK* - C 
is equal to the surplus, S. 
Average surplus is S/N and finding its partial derivative with 
respect to N is a(S/N)/aN. Setting it equal to zero and solving for N 
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gives the optimal population size. Further substitution gives u which 
is the radius of the optimal city. Now the increase in area is no longer 
assumed proportional to population increase as in the Tiebout model, An 
increase in marginal costs of distance now effects both density and area 
as it cannot do in the Tiebout model since density is constant. 
Summary 
The purpose of this chapter was to present an argument showing that 
a federal system develops along the lines of a Loschian hierarchy. Losch 
was reviewed and explained in section one. The type of hierarchy devel-
oped and the approach to testing it reviewed in section II both provide 
clues to an approach which can be taken in a theoretical and empirical 
analysis of a public sector hierarchy. Section II reviewed the main 
theoretical work on public sector hierarchies. All of the theories 
suggested thus far result in a hierarchial overlay of expenditure, 
Recall for instance that Breton developed a utility function where spill-
over benefits were spatially distributed and determined the size and 
number of orders of government. Oates and Tullock considered political 
and decision costs. Tiebout manufactured a perfect hierarchy consider-
ing two aspects of cost minimization in space. Borukhov added popula-
tion density to Tiebout 1 s effort. The maximization models of Breton and 
Borukhov do not allow the development of an empirical specification 
designed to analyze all of the different types of costs introduced by 
Oates, Tiebout and Tullock. 
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This chapter has demonstrated that a simple model which analyzes 
the spatial aspects of state and local government expenditure should 
incorporate the following variables: population density, area, political 
costs and the distance between points of allocation and expenditure in 
the public hierarchy. Such a model is developed in the chapter which 
sets up the empirical work which will be undertaken in Chapter IV, 
CHAPTER III 
A MODEL OF FEDERAliSM 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a model of government 
allocation in a federal system. A utility maximization model is used as 
a first step in the development of a determinant federal system. In 
Chapter II it was argued this system results in an overlay of expendi-
ture analogous to the Loschian hierarchy in the private sector. In 
Chapter IV the model will be applied to an empirical analysis of Oklahoma. 
A Model 
One Public Good 
Start with a country that has ~square miles of area and l thousands 
of people. This means A/Y square miles per person. Since this is a new 
country it begins with no public goods or government administrative 
apparatus except a central government that has a constitution and a body 
of laws. Assume that stabilization and distribution are dealt with by 
this central government and that the economy is stabilized and distribu-
tion is considered 11 SOcially 11 acceptable. Allocation over the~ square 
miles of this country begins one public good at a time with simple 
majority voting and single peaked preferences. 
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Suppose allocations begin in this hypothetical country with units 
of police protection (y) and a private good (x). Equation (1) represents 
the utility function for the median voter: 
(1) u = f(x,y) 
where u is utility with au/ax > 0, and au/ay > 0. 1 
In this model however, police protection is measured in efficiency 
units. Thus y equals the amount of police protection per policeman (m) 
times the number of policemen (M). Therefore: 
(2) y = mM 
The efficiency units per policeman, m, depends on: (Up) the popula-
tion density of the people being protected, (A) the area over which 
protection is provided, (D) the distance between points of allocation 
and, (G) governments per person that exist for allocating goods through 
the public sector. These factors influence the amount of police protec-
tion available because they all affect the ability of a police force 
to do its job. Therefore the quantity m is represented by the equation 
(3) below: 
(3) m = m(Up,A,D,G) 
where am/aUP < 0, am/aA < 0, am/aD < 0, am/aG < 0. 
1The median voter is used because in a political system where 
majority rules, the median or fifty-first percentile voter is assumed 
to decide the outcome of an election. Suppose there is a continuum of 
individual preferences for a particular public service. Some voters 
might prefer zero dollar expenditures on a particular public service 
while others might prefer a little and others a great deal. For those 
who want a large dollar expenditure on a public service to win support 
they must compromise their wishes to gain a majority. Those who want 
little or no publfc expenditure must agree to accept a little more 
expenditure in order to obtain a needed majority. The result is that 
the preferences of the median voter prevail in a simple majority voting 
system. Since this is the system used in the United States political 
system, the utility function of the median voter is used to represent 
allocation in the public hierarchy. 
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The derivatives for UP, A, D and G are hypothesized to have negative 
signs, therefore as the four variables increase they cause a decline in 
the amount of police protection available. For example, the level of 
protection from a police department declines as the area over which it 
operates increases. 2 Therefor~, the value of am/aA is less than zero. 
Likewise am/aUP is less than zero because congestion lowers the effec-
tiveness of a police force. More time might be devoted to traffic con-
trol as population density increases. Crime prevention is more 
difficult in densely populated areas. am/aD is less than zero also. 
As distance from the next level of government increases, output of 
police protection declines because spillover declines for the median 
voter. 
The utility maximizing solution is found by maximizing equation (1): 
( 1) U = f (X ,y) 
subject to the transformation function which defines the cost to the 
median voter of a public good~ here police protection, expressed in 
terms of the amount foregone of a private good. The Budget constraint 
is equation (4): 
(4) T0y + Px - I = T0m(Up,A,D,G)M + Px - I = 0 
where I is income, P is the price of the private good and T0 is the 
part of the efficiency wage rate paid by the median voter. Suppose the 
.Lagrangian function Z = f(x,y) + A(T0 m(UP,A,D,G)M + Px - I) applies to 
the median voter in the entire country. Maximizing Z yields equations: 
(5) 
(6) 
Z = u + AT m = 0 M y o 
Z = u m + AP = 0 X X 
2This assumes a constant level of technology and capital equipment. Without this assump~ion, the negative derivative might not hold. 
(7) ZA ~ T0 mM + Px ~ I = 0 
where Zm = aZ/aM and so on. 
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Solving these equations simultaneously yields the maximum critical values 
for M, x and Ao Second order conditions for a maximum require the 
successive bordered principal minors of the relevant bordered Hession 
determinant to alternate in sign. We will assume second order conditions 
are satisfiedo The first order conditions give t~e preference maxjmiz~ 
ing values, when Z applies to the entire countryo For example, the 
value of M would be the number of policemen which would maximize utility 
for the entire country. These equations yield a solution similar to that 
obtained from conventional analysis of; the consumer. The ratio of mar-
ginal utilities to prices equals each other and A. If this were not the 
case, the median voter could make himself better off by changing the 
allocation of public goods relative to private goodso 
I 
Recall that the hypothetical country has ~square miles of area. 
So far Z has been maximized for the median voter for the entire country. 
Suppose the~ square miles of area is divided into equal areas, using 
the Loschian s co~fficient from Chapter II. The~ value was three, so 
the first division is into three areas. This gives three utility func-
tions for three median voters. The maximum critical values of M, x and 
A are determined for each of the median voters in the three areas; then 
the average of the Z values for,the median voters is determinedo If 
this average figure is greater than for that of the entire country, then 
it would be best to have police protection divided into district govern-
ments for allocation of three quantities. The same process could be 
applied to 9 areas, 27 areas or 81 :areas so that the efficient sizled 
unit of government is determined. Thus the first or:der conditions apply 
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to the Z function for different configurations of space, In general, no 
theoretical reason exists for benefits to change as different orders are 
tried. Yet by such drastic changes in the group voting size from order 
to order, it would be expected that a different output maximizes utility 
from one grouping to another. 
The model could be expanded to include ~ore public goods. The 
problem is slightly more complicated when additional goods are included 
in the model but the analysis is the same. Instead of maximizing one 
public good and one private good,·maximum ~ritical values for A, a 
private good x and each of the public goods would be determined, given 
the values for Up' A, D and G. Then it is possible to divide the country 
into Loschian areas of three governments, nine governments, 27 govern-
ments and so on. A Z function could be maximized for the median voter 
for each area given the new values for UP, A, D and G. If the average 
of the Z values is greater than· for nine governments than it is for one. 
or three or 27 governments, then this would be the optim~m level of 
federalism. The model not only determines the network of government 
allocation it also determines a finite number of levels of government. 
I 
New governments are not created free of costso There are decision costs 
because now each individual votes in another set of elections. Also 
there are administrative costs associated with setting up another govern-
ment. Therefore, when costs of operating a new level of government are 
greater than the costs of forcing a public good into the existing 
government network, no new level of government is created. 
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The System as a Whole 
The model developed operates at a high degree of abstraction. 
Indeed, it assumes utility comparison and maximization. As well, it 
is an extension of the theory of economic agents in spaceo By including 
area as a variable, the geographical size of governmental area is also 
determined. The system•s division of functions between levels of 
government result in a public sector Loschian hierarchy analogous to the 
one existing in the private sector. 
By itself, the existence of the hierarchial overlay is devoid of 
policy .content. Therefore, the empirical issues addressed are the 
factors which affect expenditure distribution throughout the hierarchial 
overlay. For example, how will increase in median income affect expen-
diture in the hierarchy? The expectation is that there is a positive 
income effect so that expenditure would increase at all levels of the 
hierarchy. The relative shift in expenditure within the hierarchy 
due to an income change would depend on cost characteristics of the good. 
A second example would be a shift or change in density. What effect 
does density have on the hierarchy? The argument will be that the 
increase in density for a given area will increase congestion and shift 
expenditure toward those governments where density is greatest. Thus, 
the effort is to determine how the variables affect expenditure patterns 
in the existing hierarchy. 
Since the purpose of the empirical effort is to examine expenditure 
relationships in the hierarchy of governments for Oklahoma, it is 
necessary to convert the first-order conditions into a per capita 
expenditure equation. Solving equations (5-7) for M, yields equation 
(8), the demand function forM. 
(8) M(T0 ,m,I) = M(T0 , m(Up,A,D,G), I) = M 
Multiplying equation (8) by T0 m gives equation (9), the per capita 
expenditure function. 
(9) T0y ~ T0mM(T0 , m(Up,A,D,G),I) 
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where T0 is the part of the efficiency wage paid by the median voter for 
police protection. Therefore, T0y, is the cost to the median voter, It 
is a function of I, UP, A, D and G. Equation (9) is the estimating 
equation to be used in Chapter IV. The partial derivatives of this 
equation give the expected signs for the coefficients to be estimated 
in Chapter IV. Thus, equation (9) is crucial to the empirical work 
that begins in Chapter IV because I, Up' A, D and G become the indepen-
dent variables. Per capita expenditure is used as a proxy for T0y 
which is the dependent variable. Depending on the quality of the equa-
tions, these estimates could be useful in future planning for state and 
local governments. 
CHAPTER IV 
AN EMPIRICAL METHOD FOR OKLAHOMA 
Introduction 
Chapter III developed a model of utility maximization for the 
median voter in a federal system of government. In Chapter II it was 
argued that a federal system of government would develop into a hier-
archial overlay of government expenditure that is analogous to the 
Loschian hierarchy in the private sector. The Loschian theory was 
presented and several of the important theories on government expendi-
ture h.ierarchies were presented. The purpose of this chapter is to make 
this theory operational. No attempt will be made to assign functions to 
any particular level of government or to argue that one service configura-
tion is best. Instead the effort will be to discov~r how variables 
influence expenditure patterns in the hierarchy. The independent and 
dependent variables developed in the second and third sections of this 
chapter are implied by the model in Chapter III. The specific relation-
thip of interest for the empirical study is equation (9) from the model 
in Chapter III. Equation (9) is T0y = T0mM(T0 , m(Up,A,D,G),I). Equa-
tion (9) is ideal because per capita expenditure can be used as dependent 
variables in place of T0y. Thus UP, A, D, G and I will be independent 
variables in a linear regression while per capita expenditure will repre-
sent T0y as the dependent variable. Before the regression equations are 
presented two empirical problems are discussed. 
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Two Empirical Problems 
To date there has been a large outpouring of statistical analysis 
attempting to explain some part or subset of public sector expenditure 
relationships. Generally, two problems are evident in previous expen-
diture studies. First, there is the problem of uncertainty over the use 
of the study. Second, there is the d iffi cu lty in i dent ifyi ng whether 
the studies measure demand or supply factors. 
The problem in the first case results because most early government 
expenditure studies never made clear whether they were intended to pro-
vide an understanding of economic relationships or to predict expendi-
tures. The first efforts seemed to be predictive. Solomon Fabricant 
in an NBER study of 1952 used three independent variables to explain 
expenditure variation at the state-local level. 1 They were percent 
urbanization, population density and per capita income. The R-square 
was 72 percent. Others followed using much the same technique. Fisher 
in 1961 and 1964 added several demographic variables. 2' 3 Kurnow changed 
the form of the equation by fitting it in logs. 4 Brazer disaggregated 
the dependent variable both by region and by function. 5 Finally, Sacks 
1solomon Fabricant, The Trend of Government Activit in United States 
Since 1900, (Princeton: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1952 
2Glenn Fisher, 11 Determinants of State and Local Government: A 
Preliminary Analysis, 11 National Tax Journal, XIV (December, 1961), 
pp. 349-55. 
3Glenn Fisher, 11 Interstate Variation in State and Local Government 
Expenditure, 11 National Tax Journal (March, 1964), pp. 55-74. 
4E. Kurnow, 11 Determinants of State and Loca 1 Expenditures Reexamined, 11 
National Tax Journal, XVI (September, 1963), pp. 252-255. 
5Harvey Brazer, Cit Ex enditures in the United States, (New York: 
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1959 , pp. 1-54. 
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and Harris added federal grants-in-aid. 6 The uncertainty that arises is 
because these studies are of a predictive type. Some of the independent. 
variables are themselves components of the dependent variable. It is 
known, for example, that local governments usually are required to spend 
all federal grant-in-aid money. Therefore, it does not seem surprising 
that expenditures are 11 explained 11 by federal grants-in-aid. Morss elab-
orates this point with the following model. 7 Y is state and local expen-
diture, z1 is federal aid payments to states and localities and z2 is 
state and local expenditures other than those financed by federal aid 
payments. Using 1960 per capita expenditures he found that Y fit to z1 
gave: 
2 -v = 226.96 + 1.2sz1, · R - .30 (,. 27) 
Although only one variable was fit, the results suggest a significant 
positive relationship between z1 and Y with 30 percent of the variation 
explained, However, if z2 is fit to z1 so that the portion of local 
expenditure that comes from the federal government is removed, then: 
z2 = 227.30 + .2sz1, R2 = .o2. 
Now the coefficient of the variable is not significant and only two 
percent of the variation has been explained. The two equations differ 
because the first contains a portion of an identity between z1 andY. 
The two move together because z1 is a component of the other. There is 
6s. Sacks and H. Harris, 11 The Determinants of State and Local 
Government Expenditures and Inter-governmental Flows of Funds, 11 
National Tax Journal,. XVII.(Ma.rc.h 19.6.4), pp .. 75-85. 
7Elliott R. Morss, 11 Some Thoughts on the Determinants of State and 
Local Expenditures, 11 National Tax Journal, XIX (March 1966), pp. 95-103. 
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nothing wrong with this technique, but it does serve to show the 
difference between a predictive variable and one that is used to under-
stand some relationship, economic or otherwise. The purpose of the 
predictive variable is to raise the R2 so that one can predict with the 
equation. It is precisely the predictive variable which is avoided in 
the empirical work that follows. Instead, the equations presented 
include variables which can help in understanding what factors influence 
expenditure patterns in the theoretical hierarchy. 
The second difficulty is the separation of cost factors from 
demand factors. Musgrave criticizes much of the research for its 
inability to disentangle these forces. 8 A better separation, he thinks, 
is not an insoluble problem. The basic ambiguity arises from demographic 
variables. Suppose there is a city that has X square miles of area and 
1,000 people. With 1,000 people, city services are limited. Say there 
is only a volunteer fire department, one policeman, a city dump and a 
small library. City government is conducted at evening meetings in a 
local school. Now, suppose the city grows suddenly to 10,000 people. 
City services grow also. The police force is increased to eight. The 
library doubles. A full-time fire department is hired. Water mains and 
sewerage 1 ines are put in. A city hall and a park are bui1 t. Is the 
growth of city services due to an increase in demand or a decrease in 
cost'.? Is there any reason to suppose that the 1 ,000 people 1 i v'i ng 
together should suddenly change their demand for services because more 
people moved in? If public output is defined as a unit of service, there 
8Richard Musgrave, 11 Discussion of Part III, the Urban Public 
Economy~~~ Issues in Urban Economics, Ed. H, Perloff and L. Wingo 
(Resources for the Future: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), 
pp. 567-574. 
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seems no a priori reason to believe an individual in a large city 
necessarily has any different demand for public services than an indivi-
dual in a small city or even an isolated individual in the county. If 
,,,.,.,. 
police protection is defined as a unit of crime prevention and not 
numbers of policemen or police cars, then the larger police force in the 
city with 10,000 people is a result of an effort to maintain the same 
level of protection as in the city with 1,000 population. If crime is 
higher per person in the larger city, a higher expenditure per person 
can be termed a higher cost of crime due to congestion or urbanization. 
In effect, what is argued is the demand of the median voter does not 
show any systematic change no matter how space is divided. Why should 
the isolated individual necessarily have less desire for fire protection, 
or books or parks or trash pickup than his urban counterpart? He very 
likely does not get the service, but this is because there are no other 
individuals to share the cost. If all residents of a county demand 
equal services no matter where they live, either in a city or in a remote 
rural area in the county, then each resident gets fire protection where 
a fire truck can spray X gallons of water on a building or house in Y 
minutes. Obviously, it costs more to provide this service to an indivi-
dual living in the remote area than in a city because one fire truck and 
its crew may have to s ta,nd ready to protect one house in the remote a rea. 
By living in close proximity the group can share the expense. Increased 
city expenditure in response to increased urbanization results from a 
lower cost per person for public goods and services as well as from a 
higher cost per person in achieving a given service level. 
The purpose of this discussion on empirical problems is to clarify 
two things: (1) th~ equations to follow ar~ not to be predictive 
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equations but are designed to help understand local government expendi-
ture and (2) it is argued the variables presented, except income, are 
inherantly cost and not demand related. 
Analysis of City and' County Per Capita Expenditure 
Introduction 
The purpose of this section is to develop a regression model using 
as independent variables those from equation (9) in Chapter III. Per 
capita expenditure is used as the dependent variable. 
Equation 
The regression equation below links the analysis of Chapter II and 
III and provides an approach to the empirical work for Oklahoma. v1 
below represents T0y from equation (9). The independent variables below 
represent the variables UP, A, D, G and I from equation (9). The regres-
sion equation is: 
In v. = ~ + Sln U . + ~ln A. + ~ln E. + eln(l/n~o .. )1 + 1 p1 . 1 1 J1 
~ln(l/n~Dji) 2 + ~ln(l/n~Dji) 3 + nln Ymi' n = 77, 
where: 
Vi = per capita expenditure by category h. 
Up; = per~e~t of population in county i that l.ives in 
mum c1 pa 1 areas. 
the percent of the tota 1 county area for county i that 
is legally contained in municipal .areas. 
number of elected officials in county i, elected fork 
city and county governments. 
Data 
the sum of incorporated city distance for city j 
from the county seat of county i by county divided 
by the number of cities, n, in city i, or the 
average distance of cities from the county seat. 
the sum of incorporated city distance for city j 
from the nearest city for each city in county i 
divided by the number of cities, n, in county i, 
or the average.distance between cities. 
the sum of incorporated city distance for city 
j from the nearest city at 1 east twice as 1 arge 
or at least2~500 population fo.r each town in 
county i divided by the number of cities, n, in 
county i, or the average distance from a 11 large 11 
c.ity, 
Ymi = median family income by county i. 
The data relied on for these first estimates were taken from the 
1967 Area Measurement Reports and the 1967 Census of Governments. 9,10 
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The second estimates use 1972 data. The Area_ Measurement Reports are a 
series of state reports presenting measurements of surface area for 
selected geograohic units. The report was prepared by the Geography 
Division of the Bureau of the Census. The Census of Governments is a 
publication of state, county, city and special district government 
reports. It is published every five years and contains data on expendi-
ture and revenue. 
The raw data were combined to form the variables used in the 
regression analysis. For example, the dependent variable for the per 
capita equations required that county expenditure categories be divided 
9u.s. Bureau of the Census, Area Measurement Reports, Series GE-20, 
No. 38 (Washington, D.C., 1967). 
10u.s. Bureau of the Census, Census of Governments, 1967, Vol. 7, 
State Reports, No. 36 (Washington, D.C., 1970). 
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by county population. The urbanized population variable used the same 
population data and expressed it as the ratio of city population for 
each county area to the total population in each county. The intercensal 
population estimates were taken from the Census of Governments for 1967 
and 1972. The urbanized area variable was constructed from the Area 
Measurement Reports of 1967. Total area for each county was,divided 
into total urbanized area for each county. The updated area estimates 
for 1972 were obtained over the telephone from the Bureau of the Census 
in Suitland, Maryland. The median family income data was chosen over 
mean family income in order to eliminate any extreme income values which 
might influence the data for each county. The elected officials data 
which were used to approximate the ~variable in Chapter III were taken 
directly from the Census of Governments. data and were not changed from 
their published form. The data for the distance variables were taken 
from a road map and rounded to the nearest mile. Since the distance 
variables are an attempt to measure the interjurisdictional spillover, 
it was best to measure distance over well traveled routes, Other pos-
sible measures, such as direct distance, do not tell how people get 
around and possibly use other services. 
Rationale 
The variables included in the model in Chapter III are used here 
to examine the extent of their influence on per capita expenditure by 
individuals in the hierarchy of governments. All of the coefficients 
are expected to be positive. The rationale for the expected results is 
given below. 
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The coefficient of ln U . is expected to be positive because an P1 , 
increase in urbanization is associated with an increase in congestion 
because congestion lowers the effectiveness of a level of public service. 
Therefore, to maintain the service level more e~penditure is required. 
An increase in ·urbanization decreases the amount of service availab)e 
due to increased-congestion. The argument is that congestion increases 
the tax cost of maintaining the desired service level and this increases 
expenditures. 
The coefficient for 1 n A; is expected to be pos1~tive for city 
residents only. Allocation over a wider spatial' ar~a decreases the 
quality of a given output. For example, poljce protection declines if 
the same number of policemen serve a wider rather than a smaller area. 
Therefore, the cost of maintaining a given service level increases as 
area increases. Expenditure increases making the coefffcient positive 
for city residents. Since A; is urbanized area, a higher percent of 
urbanized area should have insignificant results for county categories. 
The variable E is a proxy for the costs of government. In Chapter 
III it w~s argued publi~ services decline as the number of-gov~rpments 
increase. Additional electigns, added government officials, and 
increased administrative costs were given as largely responsible for the 
decline in service levels. Since expenditure is used as· a proxy for T0y, 
it is expected that increased government costs resulting from more 
governments wi 11 increase expenditures. The coe.ffi c i ent should be 
positive. 
The distance variables measure the interrelationship between 
government expenditure. The coeffi~ients should be positive because the 
larger the value of the distance variable, the greater the distance 
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between cities and th~refore the more cities must rely on their own 
expenditure. For example, as the index of city distance fro~ the county 
seat increases, city expenditure should increase. This assumes that 
closeness to the county seat gives expenditure advantages to cities that 
are reflected in its spending. 
Although the equations in Chapter III have only one distance vari-
able, it was decided to use three different specifications in the 
empirical work because it allows a broader examination of distance 
factors. 
Median family income shows how income changes affect demand .for 
public expenditure. Income effects are almost always positive so that 
a positive coefficient is expected. 
Results 
Expenditure figures in Table IV are divided into four classifica-
tions. Equations one and two are expenditures allocated only by county 
governments. Equations three through eight are county expenditures for 
goods and services also allocated by city governmentso Equation nine is 
for natural resource expenditures allocated exclusively by county govern-
ments. Equations 10 through 15 are city expenditures allocated only by 
the city governments for each county area. Equations 16 through 21 are 
city expenditures allocated by county governm~nts as well. F-values are 
in parenthesis. An F-value of 3.98 or better indicates a 95 percent 
significanceo ·An F-value of 2.79 or better gives a significance reading 
of 90 percent. 
The purpose of the linear regression is to test significance of 
variables and to compare the size of coefficients for different 
TABLE IV 
PER CAPITA EXPENDITURE EQUATIONS 
Equations 
Dep. Var. ln A ln up ln Ym 1 n E 1 n ( l:Dj ;fn) 1 ln(l:Dji/n)2 ln(l:Dji/n)3 
County Expenditure by County Only 
(1) Public 
welfare (PW) 
1967 -.29 .98 1.58 (7. 1 ) (5.0) (8.4) 
1972 -.21 2.80 
.41 (4.8) (43.3) (3.3) 
(2) Health (H) 
1967 
1972 
County Expenditure for Services Allocated by City and County Government 
(3) Financial 
adm1n1stration ($c0 ) 
1967 -.22 .35 .37 -;30 
. 19 (22.5) (4.6) (3.4) (9. 7) (4.1) 
1972 
-.46 .35 (20.2) (11 .6) 
*The F level to enter was set at a minimum of 2.0. Thus, no variables were entered if the F statistic was below 2.0. 
This accounts for the R-squares of zero. 
R2 
.27 
.42 
.00* 
.00 
.58 
.37 
CJ1 
co 
TABLE IV (Continued) 
Dep. Var. ln A 1 n up ln Ym ln E 1 n(l:Dj;ln) 1 ln{LDj;ln) 2 ln(l:Dj;ln)3 R2 
(4) General 
Contro 1 ( Gco) 
1967 
-.24 
.89 
-.34 
.50 (24.8) (18.4) (8. 5) 
1972 
.00 
(5) Police (Pc0 ) 
1967 
-.25 .65 
-. 31 
.29 (10.6) (7.4) (3.4) 
1972 
-.34 
.09 (7.5) 
(6) Public 
Buildings (Mc0 ) 
1967 
.00 1972 
.00 
(7) Highways (Qc0 ) 
1967 
-.44 .77 
.37 .36 (24.5) (6.4) (3.4) 1972 
-.35 . 39 
.26 (26.4) (4. 7) 
(8) All 
Expenditures (Zc0 ) 
1967 
-. 31 
.55 . 
-.40 
.53 {27.9) {9. 1) {9.6) 
1972 
-.27 
-.45 
.37 . 61 (J"1 {18. 6) {12.8) (9.9) 1..0 
Dep. Var. 
(9) Natural 
ReSOiirCes ( NR) 
1967 
1972 
(10) Fire 
Protection (F) 
1967 
1972 
(11) Sewerage (Se) 
1967 
1972 
( 12) Sewerage with 
no capital (Sel) 
1967 
1972 
ln A 
-.67 
(29.4) 
-.48 
(9.2) 
.34 
(1 0.8) 
.77 
(10.8) 
ln up 
TABLE IV (Continued) 
ln Ym ln E 1 n(I:Dji/n)1 ln(I:Dj;ln) 2 
Natural Resources Allocated by County Government 
3.11 
(25.2) 
3.20 
(22.5) 
-.79 
(4.5) 
City Expenditure Allocated Only by the City Governments 
2.00 
(28.2) 
2.40 
(12.0) 
1.83 
(4. 9) 
3.8 
(18.1) 
2.10 
(8. 1 ) 
3.9 
(23.3) 
2.50 
(4.0) 
2.20 
(4.0) 
1.14 
(5.2) 
ln(I:Dji/n) 3 R2 
.34 
.36 
.54 
.52 
. 21 
.36 
.20 
.40 O'l 
0 
TABLE IV (Continued) 
Dep. Var. l n A 1 n up ln Ym l n E ln(4Dj;fnl 1 l n(l:Dj ;fnl 2 ln(l:Dj;fn) 3 R2 
(13) Sanitation (Sa) 
1967 2.77 3.25 l. 73 
.42 (16. 0) (8.2) (12. 3) 
1972 .52 3.64 2.58 
.50 (5.6) (17 .8) (5.6) 
(14) Library (B) 
l 967 2.60 .83 
.39 (6.6) (4 .l) 
l 972 .51 
. l 0 (5.6) 
(15) Parks and 
Recreation {PR) 
1967 2.86 1.53 
.56 (8.8) {15. 3) 
l 972 3.60 l. 50 
.34 {25.2) (8.4) 
City Expenditure for Services Allocated by City and County Government 
(16) Financial 
Administration ($ci) 
1967 
.00 
l 972 2.10 
. 17 {8. 7) 
( 17) General 
Control (Gci) 
1967 
.64 
.54 
.09 (7. l) (12.2) 
O"l 
__, 1972 
.00 
Dep. Var. ln A 1 n up 
(18) Police (pci) 
1967 
1972 
(19) Public 
Buildinc;s (Mci) 
1967 .52 
(4.9) 
1972 .87 
(6.3) 
(20) Highways (Qci) 
1967 .11 
(3.8) 
1972 
(21) All 
Expenditures (Zcil 
1967 .20 .34 
(17. 1) (3.2) 
TABLE IV (Continued) 
ln Ym ln E ln(I:Dj;fnl1 
.65 
(4.8) 
1.69 
(3. 7) 
.89 
(10.0) 
.73 
(6.3) 
.57 
(5. 7) 
ln(I:Dj;ln) 2 ln(I:Dj;fnl 3 
.25 
(5. 7) 
R2 
.20 
.00 
.06 
.26 
.24 
.05 
.46 
en 
N 
Table IV (continued) 
where the dependent variables are listed below: 
PW = county government per capita expenditure 5el = city government per capita expenditure for on public welfare sewerage with no capital 
H = county government per capita expenditure sa = city government per capita expenditure on on health sanitation 
$co = county government per capita expenditure B = city· government per capita expenditure on for financial administration libraries 
6co = county government per capita expenditure PR = city government per capita expenditure on for general control parks and recreation 
p co = county government per capita expenditure $ci = city government per capita expenditure on for police protection financial administration 
Mco = county government per capita expenditure on G . = city government per capita expenditure on public buildings Cl genera 1 control 
Qco = county government per capita expenditure on p . = city government per capita expenditure on highways Cl police protection 
zco = county government per capita expenditure for Mci = city government per capita expenditure on ~otal expenditures general public buildings 
NR = county government per capita expenditure for Qci = city government per capita expenditure on natural resources highways 
F. = city government per capita expenditure for z . = city government per capita expenditure on fire protection Cl total expenditures 
Se . = city government per capita expenditure for 
sewerage 
(j) 
w 
64 
expenditure categories. The specific statistical procedures for select-
ing variables was stepwise regression. Although no single selection 
technique is necessarily best, a stepwise routine is superior for use 
here. Stepwise regression provides a judgment on the contribution made 
by each variable as though it had been the most recent variable entered, 
without regard to its actual place of entry. 11 Thus, the fact that any 
variable which provides a non-significant effect is removed leads Draper 
and Smith to conclude that a stepwise method is the best selection 
procedure. 12 . In presenting results only the final equation in the step-
wise procedure is presented. 
The percent of variation in the dependent variable explained, the 
R-square, is not expected to be high. 
. -- 2 
First, R •s are often low in a 
cross section a~alysis. Second, the exclusion of intergovernmental 
revenue from the explanation of local expenditure, for the reasons 
discussed above and because the cost of breaking down intergovernmental 
revenue by category for county and city expenditures is prohibitive, 
will reduce R2•s. Third, various institutional considerations are 
, ignored. 
The procedure followed in this section compares elasticities 
between the county and city expenditure equations. By comparing these 
elasticities, it is possible to see how the variables affect per capita. 
expenditure for city and county residents. Given that the equations are 
specified in a nontypical way, the median income variable is crucial. An 
a priori restriction that one might place on the coefficeint of median 
11 . 
. N. R. Draper and H. Smith, Applied Regression Analysis, (New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966), p. 172. 
12Ibid., p. 173. 
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income is that it would be non-negative. Furthermore, it would be 
expected to be larger for what one might call non-essential services. 
Since these restrictions were not imposed on the estimating equation, a 
comparison of these expected results with the estimated coefficients may 
give some idea of the reasonableness of the estimated equation. Per 
capita expenditures increase with median income for almost one-half of 
the equations estimated for the year 1967. However, in 1972 less than 
one-third of the equations estimated had significant coefficients on 
median income. However, none of the coefficients are negative, Further-
more, the coefficients, where significant, tend to be larger for such 
items 'aS parks and recreation and public welfare than for financial 
administration and general control. Intuitively, the latter categories 
would be expected to be income inelastic and the former categories 
income elastic. The reduced importance of income in 1972 compared to 
1967 could indicate that more services were financed by the state and 
federal government in the latter year. In general, the income variable 
performs as expected lending support to the model. Finally, in 1967, at 
least, the positive elasticity for the total expenditures per capita 
cat~gory combined with generally high elasticities for the individual 
city categories indicates that increased median income would result in 
higher per capita expenditure for city residents relative to county 
residents. 
The first hypothesis with regard to the spatial structure of govern-
ment to be investigated is that increased congestion, measured by the 
I 
percent of the county population urbanized, results in a higher cost of 
providing public services. This higher cost is expected to be restricted 
to city residents and to be apparent in higher per capita expenditures 
for city residents. For total expenditures the hypothesis is rejected 
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for 1972 (the coefficients are not significant), and can be supported 
for 1967 only with modification. In 1967 the coefficents are positive 
for per capita expenditure for both county residents and city residents. 
However, the coefficients for county residents (.55) is larger than the 
coefficient for city residents (.34). This somewhat surprising result, 
that increased urbanization increases per capita expenditures more for 
county residents than for city residents, might be clarified by an 
examination of the individual expenditure categories. The increase in 
per capita county expenditures attributed to urbanization is due to an 
increase in public welfare (an exclusive county function), county police 
protection, county highways and county financial administration. The 
generally larger elasticity coefficients for city fire protection, 
sewerage, sanitation and police protection do not offset the large coeffi-
cients for county per capita expenditures. For 1972, the urbanization 
variable is significant only for county per capita expenditures for 
highways. For cities it is significant for fire protection, sanitation, 
sewerage, parks and recreation and financial administration. The aggrega-
tion of the individual categories hides the significance of the urbaniza-
tion variation for both city and county for 1972. 
The estimated equations reveal several important conclusions about 
urbanization: 1) increased urbanization of the population may increase 
per capita expenditures for both city and county residents; 2) per 
capita county highway expenditures at least increase with urbanization 
indicating that increased urbanization imposes costs on non-urban 
residents; 3) city per capita expenditure for sanitation, sewerage and 
perhaps for parks and recreation, highways and financial administration 
go up with increased urbanization; and 4) aggregation into a total 
expenditure category can hide these results. 
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The next spatial hypothesis with respect to per capita expenditures 
is that an increased percentage of the county area which is urbanized 
results in an increase in per capita expenditures for city residents 
because of a relative increase in the area over which the public output 
must be allocated. Conversely, the coefficient for county per capita 
expenditures is expected to be negative. The coefficient, as expected, 
is negative for total county expenditures in 1967 and 1972. For 1967, 
the coefficient is negative for all county expenditure categories 
except health and public buildings. These two categories would probably 
be concentrated in the county seat; thus, the reduction in the non~urban­
ized area probably would not be expected to affect them. For 1972, 
financial administration and general control, in addition to the 
previously mentioned categories, are insignificant. The categories 
such as public welfare, police, highways for which a reduced relative 
area of distribution would be expected to reduce costs do, in fact, 
, have significant, negative coefficients. 
The results for city per capita expenditures are not as striking. 
The total city expenditures per capita increase with a relative increase 
in urbanized area in 1967 but not in 1972. However, fire protection, the 
category which might be expected to have the largest cost increase with 
increased relative area, does have a significant positive coefficient 
for both years, In addition, highways and public buildings have 
significant, positive coefficients for 1967 and sanitation, libraries 
and buildings have the expected coefficients for 1972. Although one can 
see that relatively larger urbanized areas could lead to additional 
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decentralized building activity, it is difficult to understand why 
sanitation, sewerage and particularly police protection per capita costs 
apparently do not increase with an increase in the percent of the total 
area which is urbanized. Apparently, the marginal cost of an increase 
in area is equal to the average cost for those cat~gories. , 
The results with the area variable suggest~he,following: 1) per 
capita county expenditures, particularly those with a spatial dimension, 
fall with decreased relative urban area; 2) per capita city expenditure.· 
increase for fire protection and public buildings with increased 
relative urban area; 3) some categories such as police protection which 
would be expected to have a spatial dimension apparently do not. 
The number of elected officials in a county isexpected to measure 
increased administrative and political costs with more government 
activity, Somewhat surprisingly, this variable reduces total per capita 
expenditure at the county level for both 1967 and 1972. It also reduces 
per capita expenditure for several individual categories in both years. 
Possibly an increased number of elected officials allows county residents 
to articulate a desire for reduced per capita county expenditure in 
return for either increased city expenditure or tax reduction. 
The coefficient does have the expected positive sign for such 
individual city per capita expenditures as sanitation, libraries, parks 
and recreation and public buildings in one or both of the years studied. 
Either urban r~sidents with more elected county officials are better 
able to articulate their desires for such urban services, or more 
cynically, politicians like to build monuments. However, for 1972 the 
coefficient for total city expenditure per capi-ta is negative. Although 
it does not in general perform as expected, the elected officials 
variable does provide results of interest. 
The variables measuring distance between cities perform poorly. 
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For 1967 they have significant positive coefficients for county highways 
and financial administration; for 1972, the expected results are obtained 
for public welfare (a county function) and county financial administra-
tion and total per capita county expenditures. The hypothesis is that 
an increased spread of city governments within a county will reduce 
possible spillover. benefits between cities and intrease the cost of 
providing county services to cities. To some extent the hypothesis is 
supported. 
This distance variable performs poorly for the city categories. 
Total city per capita expenditures for 1967, for instance increase with 
; 
the distance between cities and, importantly, fire protection costs for 
1972 apparently increase with distance between cities. The hypothesis, 
again, is that a city A near to city B might reduce the cost to city A 
of providing a given public service (and vice versa) because of spill-
over benefits. In general, the output of a public service provided by 
one city does not spill over in any obvious way to another city. 
Presumably, a resident of one city in Payne county, say Perry, could 
use the parks of another city, say Stillwater. However, it is not 
obvious that a citizen of one city could use the sanitation system of 
another. Fire protection represents a significant exception. A 
conflagration in Perry might result in the Stillwater fire department 
providing assistance and vice versa. Thus, the two cities could, and 
in fact do help insure each other. Obviously, the greater the distance 
apart, the less likely it is that such spillover benefits could occur. 
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The significant variable for fire protection is, of course, consistent 
with this hypothesis. 13 
Summary 
This part of the empirical work has performed two major functions. 
First, it shows that the model of the median voter developed in 
Chapter III is not inconsistent with the situation in Oklahoma and 
suggests that the proxies for the costs of supplying public output are 
reasonable. Second, it provides a rationale for a continuation of an 
empirical study of the determinants of expenditures in the Oklahoma 
hierarchy of governments. The next section begins the study of these 
determinants. 
Analysis of City and County Expenditure 
Introduction 
The purpose of this section is to fit a regression model using the 
independent variables from equation (9) in Chapter III. The dependent 
variable will be dollar expenditures instead of the per capita expen-
diture measure used in the first regression model. The analysis switches 
to expenditures by government rather than per capita expenditures. The 
results above suggest that the model of Chapter III has identified 
relevant factors affecting the cost of providing public services. Now, 
th~ dissertation moves to its main fo~us, the explanation of the 
determinants of expenditure in a given public hierarchy. The per capita 
13I am indebted to Dr. Donald L. Moomaw for his thoughts for this 
section. 
expenditure equations were an application of the median voter model 
from Chapter III. By multiplying equation (9) from Chapter III by f, 
population, the model is converted to dollar expenditures. 
Equation 
The equation is: 
In X; = ~+ Sln Up; + slri A1 + ~ln Ei + eln(l/n~Dji)l + 
~ln(l/nLDj;) 2 + ~ln(l/n~Dji) 3 + nln Ymi' n ~ 77, 
where: 
= dollar expenditure by category h, 
A .. = 
1 
percent of population in county i that lives in 
muniCipal areas, 
the percent of·the total county area for county i 
that is legally contained in municipal areas 
E; =number of elected officials in county i, elected 
for k city and county governments. 
the sum of incorporated city distance for 
city j from the county seat of county i 
by county divided by the number of cities, 
n, in county i , or the average distance of 
cities from the county seat, 
the sum of incorporated city distance for 
city j from the nearest city for each city 
in county i divided by the number of cities, 
n, in county i, or the average distance 
between cities, 
=the sum of incorporated city distance for 
city j from the nearest city,at least twice 
as large or at least 2,500 population for 
each town in county i divided by the number 
of cities, n, in county i, or the average 
distance from a 11 large 11 city, 
! 
Ymi =median family income by county i. 
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Rationale 
As before all of the coefficients of significant variables are 
expected to be positive. The rationale for the expected result is given 
below. 
The coefficient of the ln Up; is expected to be positive because 
congestion lowers the quality and effectiveness of a public service. 
This effect should be strongest for cities and relatively weak or non-
existent for counties. However it is possible that increased urbaniza-
tion could influence county expenditure patterns. If the urbanized 
portion of the county population uses many of the county services, then 
the county government could reflect city spending patterns. 
The argument is much the same for the coefficient of ln A;. 
Allocation over a wider spatial area decreases the quality of public 
services. For example, police protection declines if the same number 
of police serve a wider rather than a smaller area. Therefore the tax 
cost of maintaining a service level increases as area increases. This 
increases expenditure making the coefficient positive, This effect 
should be positive for cities and negative for county governments. 
The E variable is used again as a proxy for the costs of government, 
Additional elections, added government officials and increased adminis-
trative costs are given as largely responsible for the decline in 
service levels. Since it is expected that increased government costs 
resulting from more governments will increase expenditures, the coeffi-
cient should be positive. 
The coefficients for the distance variables should be positive 
because the longer the distances between cities, the more cities must 
rely on their own expenditure. For example, the third distance variable 
measures summed city distance from cities at least twice as large or 
2,500 for all cities in the county weighted by the number of cities, 
The expectation is that a larger distance index will result in higher 
city expenditures and therefore a pas iti ve coeffi ci enL 
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The median family income variable shows how income effects influ-
ence demand for public expenditure. The coefficient should be positive 
because higher income levels cause an increase in service levels. 
Results 
The expenditure figures are divided into the same four classifica-
tions as the per capita expenditure figures. Equations one and two are 
for county government expenditure only. Equations three through eight 
are county expenditure for goods and services also allocated by city 
governments a 
governments a 
Equation nine is natural resources allocated by county 
Equations 10 through 15 are city expenditures allocated 
only by the city governments for each county area. Equations 16 through 
21 are city expenditure allocated by county governments as well, F-val-
ues are in parenthesis. An F-value of 3.98 or better indicates 95 per-
cent significance. An F-value of 2.79 or better gives significance of 
90 percent. Table V presents the equations for both 1967 and 1972. 
Dollar expenditure figures provide a clearer indication of govern-
mental fiscal relationships than per capita expenditure figures, The 
intention is to compare the elasticities between the county and city 
expenditure equations, By comparing these elasticities it becomes 
possible to see how the variables change expenditure between city and 
county governments relative to each other. For example, a high median 
family income elasticity for city expenditure relative to county 
expenditure categories would cause a shift in expenditure away from 
county government toward city government as income increases. 
Dep. Var. ln A 
(1) Public 
Welfare (PW) 
1967 
.484 
(11.5) 
1972 
.330 
(6.1) 
(2) Health (H) 
1967 .570 
(11.0) 
1972 
.690 
(11. 9) 
(3) Financial 
Administration ($c0 ) 
1967 
1972 
.292 
(54.1) 
.320 
(25.5) 
TABLE V 
DOLLAR EXPENDITURE EQUATIONS 
Equations 
ln up ln Ym ln E ln(EDj;fnl 1 ln(EDj;fnl2 
County Expenditure by County Only 
3.34 
(21. 7) 
. 3.25 .85 (38.2) (8.6) 
1.57 1. 73 (4.3) (19. 3) 
1.10 
(4.75) 
County Expenditure for Services Allocated by City and County Government 
1.60 
(97.8) 
1.44 (34.0) 
.660 
(65.5) 
0 710 (27. 1) 
ln(EDj;ln) 3 
.67 
(5.9) 
.370 (18.8) 
.480 (13. 7) 
R2 
.43 
.59 
.52 
.32 
.87 
.74 
"' ..j:::o 
TABLE V (Continued) 
Dep. Var. ln A 1 n up ln Y 1 n E ln(l:Dj;ln) 1 ln(EDj/n) 2 ln(EDj/n) 3 R2 m 
(4) General 
Control (Gc0 ) 
1967 .280 1.85 .607 .345 .82 (32.0) (86.4) (36. 1) (11 .0) 
1972 .270 1.63 .87 .40 (4.1) (8.4) (7. 7) 
(5) Police (Pc0 ) 
1967 .297 1.46 .566 .317 .62 (10. 7) (13.7) (9.1) (3.16) 
1972 1.93 .81 .25 (13.2) (8.7) 
(6) General Public 
Bui 1 ding~ (Mco) 
1967 .639 .788 .40 (22.9) (5.5) 
1972 .00 
(7) Highways (Qc0 ) 
1967 1.65 .604 .372 .69 (100.3) (50.3) (17 .2) 
1972 1.20 .680 .470 .67 (63.0) (65.6) (31 .0) 
(8) All 
Expenditures (Zc0 ) 
1967 .211 1.46 .566 .506 .67 (12. 7) (35.9) (20.9) (15.8) 
1972 .230 1.20 .590 .550 .62 -....,J (12. 5) (22.0) (17. 3) (16.6) (J'l 
TABLE V (Continued) 
Dep. Var. 1 n A ln up 1 n Ym ln E 1 n(EDj;fn) 1 1 n(EDj;fn) 2 1 n(I:Dj;fn) 3 l-
Natural Resources Allocated by County Government 
(9) Natural 
Resources ( NR) 
1967 3.43 .603 
.482 .56 (80.2) (9. 4) (5.5) 1972 3.50 
.46 (63.6) 
City Expenditure Allocated Only by the City Governments 
(10) Fire 
Protection (F) 
1967 
.570 2.04 1.67 1.52 
.73 (13.6) (13. 6) (5.5) (22.3) 
1972 
.770 1.85 1.34 1.61 
.76 (22.2) (18.5) (3.5) (20.8) 
(11) Sewerage (Se) 
1967 
.899 3.34 
.32 (7.6) (7.3) 
1972 
.730 2.03 1.35 
.55 (10.7) (8.5) (7.8) 
(12) Sewerage with 
no Ca[!ital (sel) 
1967 
.858 2.06 
.32 (7.5) (6.4) 
1972 
.090 1.97 1.33 
.61 (12. 9) (10. 7) ( 10. 3) 
-....J 
0) 
TABLE V (Continued) 
Dep. Var. 1n A 1n up ln Ym 1n E 1n(l:Dj;fnl1 1n(l:Dj;ln)2 ln(l:Dji/n)3 R2 
(13) Sanitation (Sal 
1967 3.17 5.48 3.78 
.56 (7.6) (12,1} (37 .8) 
1972 .860 2,25 ,85 
.70 (21.1) (16. 2} (4.8) 
(14) Library (B) 
1967 2,97 4,13 2.06 .50 (5.5) (7.2) (8.4) 
1972 .680 1.90 1.32 . 57 (17 .1) (7.4) (11.3) 
(15) Parks and 
Recreation (PR) 
1967 3.98 4.79 2.78 .64 (10.8) (10.8) (16.5) 
1972 1.01 2.40 1.67 
.73 (28.8) (9.1) (16.6) 
City Expenditure for Services Allocated by City and County Government 
(16) Financial 
Administration ($ci) 
1967 .503 1.35 .657 .57 (14.3) (9.9) (5.7) 
1972 .620 1.86 .930 .73 (10.3) (9. 7) (4.9) 
(17) Genera 1 
Control (Gci) 
1967 .330 1.60 1.57 1.08 .76 (10.0) (17. 7) (11.6) (25.4) 
'-1 1972 .520 .99 .79 .59 '-1 (24.2) (4.8) (10.0) 
Dep. Var. l n A l n up 
(18) Police (Pci) 
1967 
.504 . 941 ( 21. l ) (5.5) 
1972 
.610 
(35. 7) 
(19} General Public 
Buildings (Mci) 
1967 
.599 .598 (8. 5) (8.46} 
1972 
.800 
(17. 0) 
(20) Highways (Qci) 
1967 
.500 1.18 (28.2) ( 11. 8) 
1972 
.440 
(24.7) 
(21) All 
Expenditures (Zci) 
1967 
.380 
(28.7} 
1972 
.540 
(50. 7) 
TABLE V (Continued) 
ln Ym l n E lnU:Dj/n)1 
l. 70 1.40 ( 12. 2) {38.2} 
1.80 1,00 (17. l) (17.8) 
1.89 1.15 (4.3) (6.0} 
l. 97 l. 50 (6.0} (l 0. 7) 
1.92 1.15 (21. l) (35.5) 
1.34 1.20 ( 12.8) (32.4) 
1.96 .794 (45. l) {28.6} 
l. 15 .770 ( 12.6) (18.3) 
ln{I:Dji/n)2 ln(EDj/n) 3 R2 
.78 
.72 
. 41 
.52 
.83 
. 71 
.74 
.75 
~ 
co 
Table V (continued) 
where the dependent variables are below: 
PW = county government expenditure on public 
welfare 
H = county government expenditure on health 
$co = county government expenditure for 
financial administration 
Gco = county government expenditure for 
general control 
Pco 
Qco 
= county-government expenditure for police 
protection 
= county government expenditure on high-
ways 
. Zco = county government expenditure for total 
expenditures 
NRco = county government expenditure for 
natural resources 
F = city government expenditure for fire 
protection 
Se = city government expenditure for sewerage 
Sel = city government expenditure for sewerage 
with no capital 
Sa = city government expenditure on sanitation 
B = city government expenditure on libraries 
PR = city gov·ernment expenditure on parks and 
recreation 
$ci = city government expenditure on financial 
administration 
Gci 
Pci 
Mci 
Qci 
zci 
= city government expenditure on general 
control 
= city government expenditure on police 
protection 
= city government expenditure on general 
public buildings 
= city government expenditure on highways 
= city government expenditure on total 
expenditures. 
""'-1 
1..0 
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The estimating equations for 1967 reveal several important conclusions. 
First, the percent urbanization variable is significant only for city 
expenditure and not at all for county expenditure. What appears to be an 
obvious relationship requires further explanation. An increase in urban-
ization could cause an increase in county expenditure. If the urbanized 
portion of the county population uses many of the county services, then 
the county gover.nment could reflect city spending patterns. This is sup-
ported by the fact that elasticities for UP fall·off somewhat for equa-
tions 16 through 20 where these city expenditure categories are shared by 
the county. Also the expenditure categor,i es of sewerage and sanitation, 
which are exclusively city expenditures, have elasticities of over three.l4 
14The regression model includes ln Up as an independent variable 
along with ln A; because this is consistent with the reasoning developed and will show expenditure relationships in the hierarchy. Recall that a basic premise involved in using linear regression is independence among the independent variables. In the extreme this requires the columns of the X matrix to be pair wise orthogonal so that no multicolinearity 
exists. Very seldom in economic data does such an ideal occur. Instead the problem is not so much whether collinearity exists but to determine the severity of it. This is because collinearity is detected by consult-ing the matrix of simple correlations and the sampling variances that are generally a standard part of regression routines. Although other studies cin local expenditure have consistently used population by county as an independent variable, it was avoided here because it was feared popula-tion by county would correlate highly with urbanization. However when population by county was included as a variable in a matrix of simple 
correlations it proved to correlate much more highly with ln A than ln Up. Further when population replaced urbanized area as a variable it proved to be less significant in explaining expenditures than urbanized area. One would have expected instead the Up and A or Up and population variables would have presented the more serious multicollinearity prob-lems, but this was not so. Apparently as the coefficient for ln A increased the number of people in the city and town areas is offset by the number of people increasing in the county areas from county to county in some basically random way. For example, if county X has 2,000 people total, 500 of which were urbanized on 15 percent of the county•s space but county Y has 8,000 population 400 of which is urbanized on 200 per-cent of the land, then both the percent of area in cities and the total population .increase while the percent of population in cities decreases. Thus as the ln A variable changes there is not a significant systematic 
change in the Up variable. This is particularly important for the 
analysis because it indicates changes in urbanized area are not indepen-dent of population but instead are reasonably so for density. 
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' The urbanized area variable was significant for 15 of the equatioiJL 
Its coefficient was positive, generally inelastic and usually more 
i ne 1 as tic for county expenditure than for· city expenditure. The fact 
that the urbanized area variable was significant for city governm~nts 
was not surprising.· Cityallocation over a greater area is expected 
to increase outlays particularly for things like sewerage and fire 
expenditure. The fact that urbanized area was also positively associ-
ated with county expenditure was less expected. However, this gives an 
i ndi cation of the spi 11 over for county and city government. Urbani zed 
areas are likely to have a large fringe of non-urbanized population. 
This fringe of population that is close to but not a part of a city 
requires the county to increase its allocation of services. The county 
is an extension of the city. This is also supported by the fact that 
natural resources, primarily a rural expenditure, show no response to 
urbanized area. Again the coefficients are modest and the effect is 
not large but it is highly significant as the large F-values indicate. 
The result of the urbanized area variable for the county equations 
is the opposite with· the result obtained from the per capita equations. 
However, these results are not inconsistent, since the county population 
surrounding the cities causes the county to spend more money as urbanized 
area increases, but the fringe population around cities does not repre-: 
sent the total population of the counties. Thus, when the total popula-
tion of the counties are divided into county expenditures to get the 
' per capita expenditure measure, per capita expenditure has a negative 
association with urbanized area. 
The elasticity of the E variable is greater than one for all but 
one of the significant city expenditure categories and less than one 
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for all but one of the significant county expenditure categories. F-
values are high. This is the opposite sign· from the per capita expendi-
ture equations for counties. -It is possible elected offieials increase 
expenditures to a·small group of constituents. Say, for example, special 
sanitation or sewera~e services we.re provided for a fringe area around 
a city. This could increase tota 1 expenditures while decreasing 
expenditures per person for the entire county. In general, the equations 
give the expected result. Greater numbers of elected officials spend 
more money because tastes and preferences are more accurately accounted 
for, administrative costs are higher, or because more elected officials 
simply like to spend more money. 
Of the distance variables, the third, aggregate city distance in 
county i from cities at least twice as large or 2,500 averaged by the 
number of cities, was the only one to be significant. Interestingly it 
is not significant for any of the city expenditures, but it was positive 
and significant for all but one of the county expenditure categories. 
Thus, it appears that as the spread of cities is larger in terms of 
distance the more important becomes the county government. This is true 
even for financial administration, and general control which undoubtedly 
results from other expenditure categories requiring additional adminis-
trative expenditure. Although the coefficients are not large and in all 
cases remain inelastic, they are positive. Furthermore their F-values 
are high and in all but one case show significance at the 99 percent 
level. Again the institutional setup in Oklahoma is ~he best explana-
tion for this result. City services like fire, police and sanitation 
seldom overlap boundaries. Given the arrangement in Oklahoma, this is 
the· best explanation for the' d·istance· between cities having no eff-ect 
on city expenditure. 
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Expenditure in all categories appears highly dependeNt on income. 
Median family income by county is significant· for almost ·all expenditure 
categories and its coefficient· is· elastic in a 11 cases. In genera 1 , the 
elasticities are higher for city than county government expenditure 
categories. This means increased median family income will cause city 
expenditures· to grow re 1 ati ve to county expenditures" Furthermore·, the 
elasticities are higher for a particular class of non-essential expendi-
tures like parks, recreation and libraries. Therefore, there is higher 
volatility of expenditure to income for these types of services. 
Since the range of the data is the same for all the equations, this fact 
gives a good indication of the divergence of expenditure and expenditure 
types for areas of different income. 
To complete the analysis 1972 data were used in the same regression 
model. The results were similar but deserve some additional comment. 
The urbanized area variable for 1967 is positive in 16 cases for both 
city and county expenditure categories. For 1972, 17 of the urbanized 
area variables are significant. All are positive for 1972 as they were 
for 1967 but it appears urbanized area has a stronger effect on city 
expenditure for 1972 than it does for 1967. All 12 city categories are 
significant f0r 1972 but only nine of 12 are significant for 1967. Also 
the coefficients are slightly higher for 1972 than for 1967. They are 
however still inelastic. The urbanized area variable reveals that both 
city and county expenditure increase as urbanized area increases. 
The urbanized population variable for 1972 was not as important 
as it was for 1967. There were no county expenditure categories 
\ 
84 
significant for either 1967 or· 1972. However, 12 of 12 of the 1967 
equations have positive·and significant coefficients fer cities, while 
only five of 12 are significant for 1972. The important city categories 
of fire, sewerage and-sanitation· are· still· significant and elastic but 
service categories shared· between the city and county are not significant 
for 1972. It is difficult to explain this result. Apparently, urbanized 
population declined in·importance·between·l967 and 1972. 
Median family income was positive, elastic and significant in 17 
of the 21 categories for 1967~ For 1972 only ten categories were 
significant. Althougha11 of them· were positive, they were less elastic 
in 1972 than~l967. This could be· due to the increased importance of 
intergovernmental grants. As well, the coefficients seem to be about 
the same ·throughout the city and county· categories. Thi·s fndicates a 
smaller relative shift to cities in response to increased median family 
income for 1972 than 1967. 
The elected officials variable is stronger for 1972 than for 1967. 
Nineteen of·the 21 expenditure categories are significant for 1972 while 
13 of 21 are significant for 1967. The elasticities show no systematic 
difference between 1972 and 1967. All are positive and all are about 
the same size. In short, more elected officials increase expenditures 
either because they raise administrative costs or because they like to 
spend more money. 
I The distance variables showed less effect in 1972 than in 1967. 
The results were very similar however because coefficients were positive, 
inelastic and significant only for county expenditure cate·gories for 
both 1967 and 1972. Six distance variables were signi'ficant for 1967, 
only four for 1972. The results support the conclusion that greater 
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distance between cities increases the importance of the county govern-
ment. In general, the 1972 dollar expenditure equations supported the 
findings from 1972. The results for 1972 are presented below the results 
for 1967 in Table V. This provides for easy comparison. 
Summary 
Using expenditure as the dependent variable provided insight into 
influences on the hierarchial overlay of governments. Urbanized popula-
tion as a percent of total county population, shifts expenditures away 
from the county order to the city order' in the hierarchy. Larger incomes 
increased both city and county order expenditures. Since the elastici-
ties were much higher for city expenditure than for county expenditure, 
it is concluded higher incomes shift expenditure to the city order 
relative to the county order. This is also true for the E variable. 
Both city and county expenditures showed positive elasticities, but the 
city elasticities were generally higher shifting expenditure toward the 
city governments. Distance between cities had a positive influence on 
county expenditure. The coefficients were larger for city categories, 
shifting expenditure toward city governments. The results show an 
interdependent but unequal function for local county and city governments. 
For example, the independent variables show weighted distance between-
cities affects the county government expenditure while weighted distance 
of the cities from the county governments does not. The county expendi-
ture sometimes assists cities in the case of spillovers. City expendi-
ture on the other hand is changed by the percent of urbanization and not 
at all by the distance variables. 
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Centralization Ratios 
Introduction 
Another technique for examining expenditure changes in a hierarchy 
of governments, is the centralization ratio. A centralization ratio is 
a measure of the share of a central government in the total public 
sector. The purpose of this section is to develop the centralization 
ratio for use in examining the overlay of expenditu~e in Oklahoma. The 
technique is to substitute the centralization ratio!for T0y from equa-
tion nine in Chapter III. The independent variables remain the same. 
Although the centralization ratio is not nearly as good a proxy for 
T0y as the earlier measure using dollar expenditures, it should provide 
help in examining the overlay of expenditure in Oklahoma. Two previous 
studies of centralization are reviewed and examined and then a similar 
procedure is appJied to Oklahoma. 
Early Studies 
This section explores the empirical use of two earlier centraliza-
tion studies. These studies were selected because they best illustrate 
the technique to be applied for Oklahoma. 
Wallace Oates begins with cross sectional data for 58 countries in 
an effort to examine to what extent selected variables explain the 
variation in centralization among countries. 15 He uses four different 
definitions of the degree of fiscal centralization. The first is the 
percentage of total public revenues collected by the central government. 
15wallace Oates, Fiscal Federalism, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 
Jovanovich, Inc. 1972), pp. 196-219. 
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The second is the share of the central government in current public 
expenditures. The third and fourth remove all expenditure but consump-
tion expenditure and non-defense consumption expenditure respectively 
from the second ratio. Ten independent variables are fit sequentially., 
I 
The first variable is the percentage of general government current 
revenue in social security contributions. This was included because 
the data he used excluded social security programs from the share of 
central government. This variable (Z) allowed for this discrepancy. 
The next class of variables is cost variables: Population (P) and 
Area (A). He argues, that for larger nations, decentralized jurisdic-
tions are better able to provide a wider range of output. 
The final class of variables suggested by Oates deals with demand. 
Demand is influenced by income and tastes and preferences. Income was 
entered directly while six dummy variables were entered to account for 
differences in tastes and preferences. These were defined either as 
homogeneous or heterogeneous and they included language (L), race (R), 
religion (T), culture (H), sectionalism (S) and federalism (F). 
The first equation and t-values was: 
( 1 ) c1 = 1 08 - 3. 1 1 n P - . 7 Z (3.0) (5.2) 
n = 58, R2 = .41 
where c1 is the first centralization ratio and P and Z are as 
indicated. Z is as expected. The log of population (P) was negatively 
related to centralization. 
Area (A) was added to P and Z with the following result: 
(2) c1 = 102 - 2.2 ln P - .001 A- .7 Z (10.4) (2.0) (1.8) (5.5) 
2 
n = 58, R = .44. 
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Area has a negative sign but is not significant. 
Income (Y) is introduced into the third equation after area is 
removed. It reads: 
( 3) c1 = 111 - 3 1 n P - . 006 Y - . 5 Z (12.6) (3.2) (3.1) (4.0) 
n = 58, R2 = .50. 
Income varies inversely to centralization. 
The six dummy variables were added one at a time. This allows an 
examination of variables intended to serve as proxies for the degree of 
diversity in demands for public services. Language, race, religion and 
culture were insignificant. Sectionalism was added to (4). Sectional-
ism is defined as geographic subareas which identify 11 Self consciously 
and distinctively 11 with that area. The equations were: 
( 4) c1 = 99 - 1 . 4 1 n P - • 006 Y - 1 2. 5 S - • 6 Z (1.3) (3.1) (3.4) (4.2) 
n = 50i R2 = .58. 
Although this is a somewhat nebulous definition, the variable proved 
significant and strongly negative. 
Since the sample size for sectionalism (S) was not equal to the 
sample size run for federalism (F), sectionalism was removed and federal-
ism was put in. Federalism (F) also was strongly negative and signifi-
cant. 
The final equation reads: 
(5) C = 96- 1.2 ln P- .004 Y- 15.9 F- .6 Z 1 (12.0)(1.3) (2.3) (4.7) (5.5) 
n = 58, R2 = .65. 
Oates shows a clearer application of theory to empiricism than others. 
It helps explain what causes expenditure levels and changes in fiscal 
patterns~ 
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Oates and Litvack 
A final review shows an even better application of theory to 
empiricism. 16 Oates and Litvack treat centralization in state-local 
finance as the result of both savings per capita from sp~eading the tax 
bill among a larger number of consumers and the possibility of associated 
congestion costs. The model assumes state governments provide a 
specified set of goods which are close to pure public goods and which 
are price inelastic. Local governments provide a variety of impure 
public goods which are subject to congestion costs and which are also 
price inelastic. With these assumptions then expenditure and price 
per capita at the state level are expected to decline as the size of 
the population increases. The size of the population in the more 
heavily concentrated local governments should have the opposite effect. 
This occurs for two reasons. There will be congestion costs. More 
public goods will be provided as population grows at the local level. 
Therefore, expenditure per capita by state government should vary 
inversely to the population while a higher concentration of population 
should increase expenditure per capita by state government at the local 
level. Fiscal concentration should bear an inverse relationship both 
to size and the concentration of the population. 
Their empirical results are given below: 
2 (1) c1 = 87 6ln P, R = .44 (-6) 
(2) 2 c1 = 90 - 4.3ln P - .3U, R = .59 (-4.4) (-4.0) 
16w. Oates and J. Litvack, 11 Group Size and the Output of Public 
Goods: Theory and an Application to State-Local Finance in the United 
States, 11 Public Finance, XXV (Spring, 1970), pp. 42-58. 
(3) c1 = 91 - 5.3 ln P - .2U + 5.9S, R2 = .66 (-5.6) (-2.5)(3.0) . 
(4) c1 = 90- 4.5ln P- .2U + 4.2S + 2,5L- 3.8C, R2 = .70 (-4.3) (-3.3)(1.6) (t.O) (-1.5) 
(5) c2 = 346 - 28ln P, R2 = .58 (-8.0) 
(6) C = 57 + 2.2U, R2 = .40 3 (5.6) 
where, 
ln P = natural log of population 
U = percent of population living in metro areas 
S = dummy variable for southern region 
E = dummy variable for northeast region 
C = dummy variable for north central regions 
c1 = state expenditure as a percent of state-local spending 
c2 = state government expenditure per capita 
c3 = local government expenditure per capita. 
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The explained variation is high and signs are as anticipated with popula-
tfon size and concentration both negative. Equation five shows that 
expenditure per capita by state governments is inversely related to 
population size. The last equation shows local spending positively 
related to urbanization. All six equations confirm the theoretical 
arguments. 
Application to Oklahoma 
The purpose in this section is to apply the centralization technique 
to the state and local government expenditure pattern i~ Oklahoma. First 
the equation is presented and explained, then the results are discussed. 
Let c1 = ex:+ Sln U . + r;ln A. + 1rln Y . + eln(l/nrD .. )1 p1 1 m1 J 1 
+ ~ln(l/niD .. )2 + ~ln(l/niD .. )3, n = 77, Jl Jl 
where: 
c. = (County Expenditure),f(County Expenditure. + city 1 Expenditure) 1, 
Upi = percent of population in county i that lives in 
municipal areas, 
A; = the percent of the tota 1 county area for county i that 
is legally contained in municipal areas 
(l/ni0 .. )1 =the sum of incorporated city distance for 
Jl city j from the county seat of county i by 
county divided by the number of cities, n, 
in county i, or average distance of cities 
from the county seat, 
the sum of incorporated city distance for 
city j from the nearest city for each city 
in county i divided by the number of cities, 
n, in county i, or average distance between 
cities, 
(l/nrD.i) 3 = the sum of incorporated city distance for 
J city j from the nearest city at least 
twice as large or at least 2,500 population 
for each town in county i divided by the 
number of cities, n, in county i, or average 
distance from a 11 large 11 city. 
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Unfortunately, the expenditure data causes some constraint on the use 
of the centralization technique. Expenditure data are not separated 
into each of the county, city and school district goverryments. Instead 
expenditure data fall into two groupings: 1) expenditures in all the 
governments located in each county, and 2) expenditure for the county 
government only. A third category is derived from the first two. 
Expenditures for the county government are subtracted from category one; 
expenditures in all governments in the county. This leaves all of the 
expenditure for city, school district and special governments by county 
lumped together. This data can be separated because school district 
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expenditures are under the heading of education-and capital expenditure 
for education. Since the special districts,are for development, irriga-
tion, soil, rural water and other specialized needs not ~ategorized, all 
of this expenditure was included under two headings: natural resources 
or other and unallocable. With special district and school district 
expenditure subtracted, the remaining expenditure is for municipalities. 
Now, all of the expenditure data is separated by go~ernment. Since city 
and county government expenditure data is now separate it is possible to 
form centralization ratios. However, only six types of expenditure are 
allocated by both city and county governments. They are financial 
administration, general control, police, highways, general public build-
ings and hospitals. This means centralization ratios can be formed only 
for all of the expenditure data aggregated or for individual expenditure 
headings. Expenditures allocated exclusively by county government 
include: public welfare, corrections and health. City or municipality 
expenditures include: fire, sewerage, sanitation, urban renewal, library 
and parks and recreation expenditures. 
Rationale 
The expectation is that all of the coefficients will be negative 
for the centralization analysis. Increases in-urbanized area (A) and 
urbanized population (UP), will increase the proportion of city expendi-
tures in total city-county expenditures. This lowers the centralization 
ratio. An increase in median family income (Ym) will ~hift expenditures 
toward cities relative to counties. Cities are better able to respond 
to the increased demands for public services by higher incomes. This 
decreases the centralization ratio. The three distance variables are 
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designed to discover the effects distance between governments has on 
costs and expenditure. Does distance between points of public service 
a 11 oca t ion influence expenditure for these governments? The first 
distance variable takes the sum of the distance of each city in a 
county from the county seat in that county and adds them. Then this 
figure is divided by the number of cities to provide an index of the 
cities distance from its county seat. Suppose a one percent increase 
in (~Dji/n) 1 causes a percentage decline in the centralization ratio. 
This means that as this index of city to county distance grows expendi-
ture costs shift to cities. The greater the distance from the county 
seat, the less the cities can rely on the county for their public service 
needs. The second and third variables measure spillovers between cities 
of any population and between cities of greater population. Therefore, 
if the distance variables are significant, an increase in the distance 
between government will increase expenditure for the cities. This 
means the coefficients will be negative. 
Results 
The first equations are listed as (1) through (6) for 1967 and 
1972. The hospital expenditure heading is not included because it was 
totally insignificant. F-values are in parenthesis. An F-value of 
3.98 or larger provides a 95 percent significance level. An F-value 
of 2.79 or better provides a 90 percent significance level. Results 
for both 1967 and 1972 are given in Table VI. Although the R-square 
figures were not large the coefficients were consistent with the earlier 
expectations. The results give an interesting mixture that varied a 
great deal depending on the centralization ratio. Equation one shows 
TABLE VI 
CENTRALIZATION RATIO EQUATIONS 
Dep. Var. ln A 1 n up ln Ym 
Centralization for Financial Administration ($$c) 
1967 
1972 
-.071 
(10.77) 
-.080 
(6.9) 
-.145 
(3.33) 
-.24 
(4.8) 
Centralization for General Control (GGc) 
1967 
1972 
-.065 
(94.76) 
-.332 
(9.25) 
Centralization for General Public Buildings (MMc) 
1967 
1972 
Centralization for Police (PPc) 
1967 
1972 
-.401 (38.6) 
-.380 
(20.5) 
Centralization for Highways (QQc) 
1967 
-.190 
-.35 
. (27.2) (3.60) 
1972 
-.14 
(1 03. 7) 
-3.30 
(4.4Q) 
Centralization Ratio for All Expenditures (ZZc) 
1967 
1972 
-.401 
(38.6) 
-.320 (68.6) 
.ln(l:Dj;fnl 1 
. where: $$c =a centralization ratio for financial administration 
GGc =a centralization ratio for general control 
MMc =a centralization ratio for general public buildings 
ln(l:Dj;fnl 2 
.245 
(4.23) 
ln(l:Dj;fn) 3 R2 
,29 
.26 
.30 
.00 
.13 
.00 
.34 
.21 
.39 
.61 
.40 
.48 
PPc =a centralization ratio for police expenditures QQc =a centralization ratio for highway expenditures 
zzc =a centralization ratio for all expenditures 
1.0 
..j:::> 
95 
the financial administration ratio with a very slight negative coeffi-
cient for ln A and a larger though still inelastic relationship to 
ln UP. The centralization ratio for general control expenditure in 
equation two. has almost the same coefficients as equation one. The 
small coefficients for urbanized area indicate that area does not cause 
a 1 arge movement between orders of government :for genera 1 contra 1 or 
financial administration. The small response to area may be a cost 
response to increased administrative costs that have resulted from 
extension of other area wide expenditures. The slightly larger coeffi-
cients for ln UP may be the result of lower individual cost for urban 
services not feasible in a less urban situation. 
In equation three with a ratio of county government expenditure on 
general public buildings to all government expenditure for general 
public buildings by county as the centralization ratio, the only 
significant variable is income. The relative amount of expenditure on 
public buildings does not show any relation to area, population or 
relative distance between cities. A one percent increase in median 
family income by county results in a 3.30 percent decrease in the 
percent of county government expenditure in total government expenditure 
in the county. Although income has no significant effect on financial 
administration or general control, the existence of public buildings 
seems dependent on high and rising incomes. Financial administration 
and general control appears to be a necessity not dependent on income, 
while public building is a luxury that higher income can pay for. 
When police and highways make up the centralization ratios, the 
negative coefficients for ln A are larger indicating that city expansion 
into larger areas for these types of expenditures means more capital 
expenditure and larger maintenance costs for further extension of 
services. Ym also is significant in explaining the shift to city 
expenditures for highways. 
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Equation six has aggregated the expenditure data for local govern-
ments. The summed expenditure data picks up the second distance 
variable. Like the first regressions, the centralization ratio equa-
tions failed to select the distance variable except for an equation or 
two. The institutional setup in Oklahoma prevents much spillover benefit 
between cities. One city is not able to use many of the services of 
another city. However equation six does show that as the index of 
distance between cities increases, more reliance is made of the county 
government. The effect is only significant when the data are aggregated. 
The 1972 equations show only five variables significant while ten 
are significant for 1967. However, the size and signs of the coeffi-
cients are the same for both 1967 and 1972. 
While the results for the centralization ratios were not outstand-
ing, they were consistent with the first two sets of equations for the 
variables significant. The negative coefficients in the centralization 
ratios indicate a relative shift toward the city level of government. 
In the per capita expenditure and dollar expenditure equations the 
elasticity coefficients for A, Up and Ym and genera,lly higher for city 
governments than county governments. This indicates a relative shift 
toward city government expenditure levels in the same way the centraliza-
tion coefficients do. The only positive coefficient for the centraliza-
tion ratio is the third distance variable in Tab,le VI. The shift 
toward county government is consistent with both the per capita expendi-
ture equations and the dollar expenditure equations. 
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Summary 
The aim in this chapter has been to examine how independent vari-
ables affect expenditure levels in a federal hierarchy. A key differ-
ence in the equations here is the disaggregation of expenditure 
categories, the lack of a wide sweeping population variable, and 
separation of expenditure categories for each order of government. The 
analysis has allowed more interpretation of differences between local 
governments. The first section showed what forces affect city and 
county per capita expenditure. The equation, rationale and results 
were given. Due to problems with the population data, results were 
good but modest. The second section showed what forces affect city 
and county dollar expenditure. The final section applied the central-
ization technique to city and county centralization ratios in an effort 
to discover what factors influence the relative shfft of expenditures. 
Again the equation used along with the rationale and results were 
presented. The results here were consistent with the previous results, 
but few var1ables were significant and R-square figures were low. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
A number of political scientists have argued -that for a 
federal system: ... what activities are expressed and 
what implied, what activities are protected, and what 
activities denied only emerge from an elaborate system 
of political 1 horse-trading 1 in which the variety1of 
interests seeking expression must be compromised. 
This dissertation has been an effort to discover existing rela-
tionships in a federal system and to refute the notion that expenditure 
activities in a federal hierarchy are merely a system of political 
11 horse-trading 11 • In practice all of the expenditure tradeoffs in a 
federal hierarchy cannot be explained by technical variables, However 
the equations in Chapter IV were designed to show what quantifiable 
factors affect expenditure movements between two orders of government, 
The results possess a considerable degree of explanatory power, Further-
more they explore into areas where others have not. First there is the 
framework of the analysis itself: a Loschian ordering of hierarchial 
governments. Also efforts were made at breaking apart each order of 
government instead of lumping them together under the category of local 
government expenditure. This allowed a more careful examination of 
relationships existing between local governments themselves instead of 
assuming they respond to the same things. Several other innovations 
1Rufus Davis, 11 The Federal Principle Reconsidered, 11 American 
Federalism in Perspective, Ed. Aaron Wildavsky (Boston: Little, Brown 
& Co., 1967), p. 10. 
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were useful. The average spatial spread of governments by county and 
proportion of urbanized area by county proved to be significant 
variables in the analysis. 
The results of the theoretical relationships tested suggest an 
interdependent but by no means equal function for governments at the 
local level. Nor do local governments respond equally to the same 
I 
99 
stimuli. The independent variables in Chapt~r IV make this stand out. 
Weighted distance between cities affects the county government expendi-
ture while weighted distance of the cities from the. county governments 
does not. The counties engage in a scattered pattern of expenditure 
sometimes assisting cities in the case of spillovers and sometimes 
providing services to cities because they are small and isolatedo In 
the case of natural resources, where most of the expenditure is in 
special districts, tt ·ts possible the slack in rural need is taken 
over by special districts that transcend county areas. City expend"iture 
on the other hand responds fairly strongly to the percent of urbanization 
but not at all to the ·distance variables. The concentration of popula-
tion increases the demand for services the county cannot easily provide 
and also for those that it doeso Median family income and elected 
officials both had significant and elastic coeffiqients for expenditure 
change. 
This study was stimulated by the need to understand the forces 
changing government expenditure requirements in a public hierarchy of 
governments. Its objective is policy oriented since good government 
planning require knowledge of factors causing growth or decline of 
government expenditures. For example, if planners know that increased 
incomes shift expenditure away from county governments toward city 
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governments, they may be able to plan more effectively. The value of 
the approach taken in this study is that it provides a sense of scale 
and content for formulation of government expenditures. If it is recog-
nized that local governments possessing certain characteristics are 
more susceptible to growth or decline than others, then planning of the 
space economy should be greatly aided. 
In concluding this study it is stressed that the empirical results 
are intended to show a way in which changes occur in a theoretical 
hierarchy of federated governments. Although more goes into predicting 
degrees of variation·than appears here it is believed that the relation-
ships posited are of importance and the empirical findings are presented 
in support of this contention. 
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